Circular Argument: What is Wrong, and Right, with the Circular 230 “Covered Opinion” Regulations by Hodaszy, Steven Z.
 
 
CIRCULAR ARGUMENT: WHAT IS WRONG, 
AND RIGHT, WITH THE CIRCULAR 230 
“COVERED OPINION” REGULATIONS 
 
Steven Z. Hodaszy∗ 
 
 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 151 
I. THE DEFINITION OF A “COVERED OPINION” AND THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR PREPARING COVERED OPINIONS. ...................................................... 154 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF, AND PURPOSE BEHIND, CIRCULAR 230’S 
COVERED OPINION REGULATIONS. ........................................................... 160 
III. THE TAX SHELTER MARKET AND THE PARTICIPATION OF 
ATTORNEYS IN ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS, WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE 
COVERED OPINION REGULATIONS. ........................................................... 162 
IV. THE MOST COMMON, AND MOST SIGNIFICANT, CRITICISMS OF THE 
COVERED OPINION REGULATIONS ............................................................ 169 
A. The Regulations are Unduly Complex .......................................... 170 
B. The Regulations Impose Prohibitive Time and Cost Burdens ...... 170 
C. The Regulations Impede Communication between Attorneys and 
Clients, and Prevent Delivery of Informal or Piecemeal Advice .......... 171 
D. The Regulations Prevent Practitioners from Exercising Professional 
Judgment in Distinguishing between Important and Unimportant Tax 
Issues ..................................................................................................... 172 
E. The Regulations are Far Too Broad, and they Capture Much More 
than the Tax Shelter Advice that they were Intended to Regulate ........ 174 
F. The Opt-Out Procedures and Related Non-Reliance Disclaimers 
Also Create Certain Problems ............................................................... 176 
G. To Address the Problems with the Non-Reliance Disclaimers, Some 
Commentators Have Recommended Switching to an Opt-In System in 
Lieu of the Opt-Out Approach .............................................................. 178 
                                                 
∗
 Copyright © 2010 by Steven Z. Hodaszy.  The author has more than 17 years of experience 
as a practicing attorney and has worked in the areas of commercial finance, structured 
finance, and litigation.  He completed an LL.M. in taxation at New York University School 
of Law in 2010.  The author wishes to thank Professor Carlton M. Smith, of Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law and New York University School of Law, for his very helpful 
comments on earlier drafts.  He also wishes to express his gratitude to the editors and staff 
members of the Columbia Journal of Tax Law for their many useful insights and their 
valuable assistance with this article.  Any errors or omissions and all opinions are, of course, 
solely those of the author. 




V. FIXING WHAT IS WRONG, AND KEEPING WHAT IS RIGHT, WITH THE 
COVERED OPINION REGULATIONS ............................................................ 179 
A. The Basic Framework of the Regulations Should Be Retained .... 179 
1. Effective Regulations Should Enlist the Aid of Practitioners in 
Deterring Clients from Engaging in Abusive Transactions .............. 180 
2. Thus Far, the Covered Opinion Regulations Have Effectively 
Created a Role for Tax Practitioners as “Gatekeepers” to Block 
Abusive Transactions ....................................................................... 182 
3. New Strict Liability Penalty for Transactions Without Economic 
Substance May Undermine the Covered Opinion Regulations’ 
Effectiveness at Creating a “Gatekeeper” Role for Tax Practitioners, 
but the Regulations Should Still Remain in Force ............................ 184 
B. “Significant Purpose” Should Be Defined So That The Regulations 
Plainly Cover Only Tax Shelter Advice, and Do Not Apply to any Other 
Tax Advice ............................................................................................ 190 
C. Calls to Adopt an Opt-In Approach Should Be Rejected .............. 192 
D. After the Regulations are Narrowed to Apply Only to Tax Shelter 
Advice, the Opt-Out System Should Also Be Done Away With .......... 196 
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 202 
 
INTRODUCTION 
If there is one thing that virtually all tax attorneys have in common, 
it is their extreme distaste for the “covered opinion” regulations under 
Treasury Department Circular No. 230 (“Circular 230”).1  Those 
regulations, which are set forth in § 10.35 of Circular 230 (the “Covered 
Opinion Regulations”),2 have been in effect since June 20, 2005,3 and they 
apply to the provision of written tax advice by any attorney or other 
practitioner permitted to practice before the Internal Revenue Service (the 
“IRS”).4  When the regulations were first published, they were met with a 
                                                 
1. The Circular 230 regulations are set forth at 31 C.F.R., Subtitle A, Part 10—
Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service.  As described in 31 C.F.R. § 10.0 (Scope of 
part), Circular 230 “contains rules governing the recognition of attorneys, certified public 
accountants, enrolled agents, and other persons representing clients before the Internal 
Revenue Service,” including, inter alia, “rules relating to authority to practice before the 
Internal Revenue Service” and prescriptions of “the duties and restrictions relating to such 
practice.” 31 C.F.R. § 10.0 (2010). 
2. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2010). 
3. Circular 230 § 10.35 “applies to written advice that is rendered after June 20, 
2005.”  31 C.F.R. § 10.35(g) (2010).     
4. Circular 230 § 10.35(a) provides that any “practitioner who provides a covered 
opinion shall comply with the standards of practice in” section 10.35.  31 C.F.R. § 10.35(a) 
(2010).  A “practitioner” for this purpose is defined in Circular 230 § 10.35(b)(1) as “any 
individual described in § 10.2(a)(5).”  31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(1) (2010).  Section 10.2(a)(5), in 
turn, defines “practitioner” as “any individual described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), or (d) of 
§ 10.3.”  31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(5) (2010).  Those paragraphs relate to attorneys, certified 
public accountants, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries, respectively.  31 C.F.R. 
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mountain of criticism, and they have not grown more popular in the years 
since.  The Covered Opinion Regulations have been attacked as unduly 
onerous, overly broad, and inimical to the provision of sound tax advice in 
a number of ways. 
As we mark their fifth-year anniversary, we should take the 
occasion to reexamine the Covered Opinion Regulations and reconsider 
whether their benefits justify their burdens.  After five years, how well do 
the regulations serve their intended purpose?  At the same time, are the 
regulations’ detriments indeed as great as their many critics assert?  Should 
we discard the Covered Opinion Regulations altogether, as some have 
suggested, or is there some compelling need for oversight of tax opinion 
practice (or, at least, a portion of that practice) that militates in favor of 
retaining some version of the regulations?  If the latter is the case, how 
should we improve upon the regulations, so that they fulfill their intended 
function without causing the harms that their critics allege?  Finally, to 
what extent might the need for, the effectiveness of, and the required 
structure of the Covered Opinion Regulations change as a result of strict-
liability penalty provisions that were recently added to the Internal Revenue 
Code (the “Code”) in conjunction with the newly-codified economic 
substance doctrine?  This Article addresses these questions. 
The Covered Opinion Regulations impose extensive due diligence 
obligations and detailed drafting requirements on practitioners with respect 
to written advice on tax matters.  Part I of the Article outlines these copious 
rules.   
The regulations were promulgated in order to combat tax 
practitioners’ support of abusive tax shelters through the delivery of 
unsound legal opinions, as noted in Part II.  During the rise of the corporate 
tax shelter market in the 1990s, as described in Part III, a surprising number 
of tax practitioners employed dubious due diligence, analytical, and 
drafting techniques to prepare incomplete and misleading tax opinions 
which concluded that abusive shelters were legitimate.  The Covered 
Opinion Regulations were introduced to stem these unscrupulous and 
harmful opinion practices. 
 In their current form, however, the Covered Opinion Regulations 
pose myriad significant, and often unnecessary, obstacles to the practice of 
tax law.  These problems, which have been raised by tax practitioners and 
tax scholars alike, are discussed in Part IV of the Article.  A practitioner can 
“opt out” of compliance with the Covered Opinion Regulations in some 
(though not all) cases, but the opt-out rules present problems of their own. 
                                                                                                                 
§ 10.3(a)-(d) (2010).  Section 10.3(a) provides that “[a]ny attorney who is not currently 
under suspension or disbarment from practice before the Internal Revenue Service may 
practice before the Internal Revenue Service by filing with the Internal Revenue Service a 
written declaration that the attorney is currently qualified as an attorney and is authorized to 
represent the party or parties.”  31 C.F.R. § 10.3(a) (2010).   




In the face of these concerns, a number of commentators contend 
that the Covered Opinion Regulations should simply be repealed altogether.  
Many others support the peculiar alternative of replacing the current opt-out 
rules with an “opt-in” regime, under which the regulations would not apply 
to any practitioner unless he or she voluntarily chooses to comply.  These 
may be simple and tempting solutions to the hassles that the current 
regulations pose, but I believe that both of these approaches are ultimately 
misguided.  While they might dispense with unnecessary obstacles to the 
practice of tax law in general, they would also eliminate necessary 
impediments to the promotion of abusive tax shelters through dishonest 
legal opinions. 
There has to be some meaningful regulation of tax shelter opinions; 
otherwise, experience indicates that too many practitioners will be enticed 
by market forces to render unsound opinions in support of illegitimate 
shelters.  Up until now, the Covered Opinion Regulations have not only 
effectively deterred such opinion practices; they have actually established 
tax practitioners as “gatekeepers” who restrain taxpayers from engaging in 
abusive transactions.  Unfortunately, going forward, this “gatekeeper” 
function might be undermined by a recently enacted strict-liability penalty 
for transactions without economic substance.  Yet that result is not a 
foregone conclusion at this point; and, even if the regulations become 
unable to do as much in the future to encourage good taxpayer behavior, 
they will still remain absolutely necessary to impede bad practitioner 
behavior.  For all of these reasons, as detailed in Part V.A, I argue that 
some version of the Covered Opinion Regulations must be retained. 
However, the regulations’ scope must be narrowed substantially, in 
order to stop the regulations from intruding into routine tax practice in ways 
that are unwarranted and counterproductive.  Perhaps the greatest criticism 
of the Covered Opinion Regulations is that they are grossly overbroad, 
applying not only to tax shelter opinions (as originally intended) but to 
virtually all routine, legitimate tax planning advice, as well.  This problem 
is the worst because it magnifies the effects of all of the others.  
Accordingly, in Part V.B of the Article, I propose a significant and specific 
textual reform to the Covered Opinion Regulations that would restrict their 
focus to opinion practice in the tax shelter area.  If this revision were 
adopted, the problems discussed in Part IV would cease to infect all aspects 
of legitimate tax counseling.  Instead, the regulations would impose only 
warranted restrictions on unscrupulous practice in the tax shelter context. 
Part V.C of the Article explains why it would be a mistake to adopt 
the opt-in approach advocated by many commentators, particularly if the 
Covered Opinion Regulations are appropriately narrowed to cover only tax 
shelter opinions.  Part V.D argues that, for similar reasons, the current opt-
out rules should be repealed once the regulations are narrowed in the way 
that Part V.B suggests.  Granting practitioners an option to avoid 
compliance with rules proscribing egregious tax shelter opinion practices 
would be bad policy in any event, but eliminating any such option will be 
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critical to the continued functioning of the regulations if the new strict 
liability penalty for transactions lacking economic substance becomes the 
predominant penalty for abusive tax shelters. 
Part VI is the conclusion of the Article.   
I. THE DEFINITION OF A “COVERED OPINION” AND THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR PREPARING COVERED OPINIONS. 
As every member of the tax bar probably knows all too well, the 
Covered Opinion Regulations impose extensive, rigorous requirements for 
written advice (including e-mails) concerning federal tax issues arising 
from (1) “[a] transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to” any 
transaction determined by the IRS “to be a tax avoidance transaction and 
identified” as such in published guidance (a “Listed Transaction”),5 (2) 
“[a]ny partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or 
any other plan or arrangement, the principal purpose of which is the 
avoidance or evasion of any tax imposed” under the Code (a “Principal 
Purpose Transaction”),6 or (3) “[a]ny partnership or other entity, any 
investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, a 
significant purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any tax 
imposed” under the Code (a “Significant Purpose Transaction”),7 if the 
written advice concerning the Significant Purpose Transaction is (a) “a 
reliance opinion;”8 (b) “a marketed opinion;”9 (c) “subject to conditions of 
confidentiality;”10 or (d) “subject to contractual protection.”11 
                                                 
5. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A) (2010). 
6. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(B) (2010). 
7. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C) (2010). 
8. Under Circular 230, “[w]ritten advice is a reliance opinion if the advice concludes 
at a confidence level of at least more likely than not (a greater than 50 percent likelihood) 
that one or more significant Federal tax issues would be resolved in the taxpayer’s favor.”  
31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(i) (2010).  A “Federal tax issue” is defined under Circular 230 as “a 
question concerning the Federal tax treatment of an item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or 
credit, the existence or absence of a taxable transfer of property, or the value of property for 
Federal tax purposes.”  31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(3) (2010).  In turn, a federal tax issue is 
“significant” if the IRS “has a reasonable basis for a successful challenge and its resolution 
could have a significant impact, whether beneficial or adverse and under any reasonably 
foreseeable circumstance, on the overall Federal tax treatment of the transaction(s) or 
matter(s) addressed in the opinion.”  Id.   
9. Circular 230 defines written advice to be a “marketed opinion” if the practitioner 
who provides the advice “knows or has reason to know that the written advice will be used 
or referred to by a person other than the practitioner (or a person who is a member of, 
associated with, or employed by the practitioner's firm) in promoting, marketing or 
recommending a partnership or other entity, investment plan or arrangement to one or more 
taxpayer(s).”  31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(5) (2010). 
10.  “Written advice is subject to conditions of confidentiality if the practitioner 
imposes on one or more recipients of the written advice a limitation on disclosure of the tax 
treatment or tax structure of the transaction and the limitation on disclosure protects the 
confidentiality of that practitioner's tax strategies, regardless of whether the limitation on 
disclosure is legally binding.”  31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(6) (2010). 




Those three classes of transactions are intended collectively to 
capture all undertakings that may constitute abusive tax shelters.  (One 
fundamental question is whether they in fact capture much more than that).  
Listed Transactions comprise the narrowest of the three groups; they are the 
transactions that the IRS has already identified as abusive.  The other two 
classes are intended to include abusive transactions that the IRS has not yet 
discovered, but wants to stop. 
In setting parameters as to what is or is not a Principal Purpose 
Transaction, the regulations make clear that a partnership, other entity, plan 
or other arrangement does not have a principal purpose of avoiding or 
evading federal tax “if that partnership, entity, plan or arrangement has as 
its purpose the claiming of tax benefits in a manner consistent with the 
[Code] and Congressional purpose.”12  Of course, an undertaking that is not 
a Principal Purpose Transaction may nevertheless be a Significant Purpose 
Transaction.  Indeed, the regulations emphasize that a “partnership, entity, 
plan or arrangement may have a significant purpose of avoidance or 
evasion even though it does not have the principal purpose of avoidance or 
evasion.”13 
Importantly, in contrast to the principal purpose standards, the 
regulations do not say that a transaction will not be deemed to have a 
significant purpose of tax avoidance or evasion if its purpose is to claim tax 
benefits in a manner consistent with the Code and Congressional purpose.14  
Particularly when juxtaposed against that express limitation in the 
“principal purpose” definition, the absence of such a limitation in defining 
“significant purpose” suggests that Significant Purpose Transactions may 
technically include even ordinary, well-established tax minimization 
strategies that are intended by Congress, expressly permitted under the 
Code, and plainly not abusive.  While nevertheless troublesome, this 
omission from the “significant purpose” definition is almost certainly not 
intended to capture ordinary tax planning in such a way.  Rather, it is more 
likely just a result of the fact that the “significant purpose” language in the 
Covered Opinion Regulations tracks (almost verbatim) the broad definition 
of “tax shelter” in § 6662 of the Code, which imposes accuracy-related 
penalties on certain underpayments of tax.15  
                                                                                                                 
11. Circular 230 refers to written advice as subject to contractual protection “if the 
taxpayer has the right to a full or partial refund of fees paid to the practitioner (or a person 
who is a member of, associated with, or employed by the practitioner's firm) if all or a part 
of the intended tax consequences from the matters addressed in the written advice are not 
sustained, or if the fees paid to the practitioner (or a person who is a member of, associated 
with, or employed by the practitioner's firm) are contingent on the taxpayer's realization of 
tax benefits from the transaction.”  31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(7) (2010). 
12. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10) (2010). 
13. Id. 
14. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C) (2010).   
15. Compare 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C) (2010) and 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10) 
(2010) with I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2010).  See Steven M. Weiser, Circular 230 
Compliance: A Guide For the on-Tax Attorney, 34 COLO. LAW. 29, 32 (2005) (noting that 
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Written advice that comes within any of the categories outlined 
above is defined in Circular 230 as a “covered opinion.”16  For any written 
advice that constitutes a covered opinion, the Covered Opinion Regulations 
set forth stringent standards that the practitioner preparing the advice must 
meet with respect to (1) finding or assuming the relevant facts, (2) relating 
the applicable law to the relevant facts, (3) evaluating significant federal tax 
issues, in particular, and (4) reaching an overall conclusion as to the likely 
federal tax treatment of the transaction to which the advice relates.17   
Regarding factual matters, Circular 230 requires the practitioner to 
“use reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain the facts . . . to determine 
which facts are relevant . . . [and to] consider all facts that the practitioner 
determines to be relevant.”18  The practitioner is prohibited from “bas[ing] 
the opinion on any unreasonable factual assumptions,” which include any 
“factual assumption that the practitioner knows or should know is incorrect 
or incomplete.”19  Nor may the practitioner base the opinion on any 
unreasonable factual representations, statements or findings of the taxpayer 
or any other person, including any “factual representation that the 
practitioner knows or should know is incorrect or incomplete.”20  As a 
primary example of an impermissible factual assumption or the improper 
reliance on someone else’s factual representation, the Covered Opinion 
Regulations specifically provide that a practitioner may not rely on a 
general assumption “that a transaction has a business purpose or that a 
transaction is potentially profitable apart from tax benefits,”21 and a 
practitioner may not rely on a taxpayer’s representation “that a transaction 
has a business purpose if the representation does not include a specific 
description of the business purpose or the practitioner knows or should 
know that the representation is incorrect or incomplete.”22  A covered 
opinion must identify, in separate sections, each factual assumption that the 
practitioner makes and each factual representation of the taxpayer on which 
the practitioner relies.23   
                                                                                                                 
the compliance-with-Code-and-purpose exception exists under the “principal purpose” 
standard but not under the “significant purpose” standard). 
16. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i) (2010). 
17. The complete requirements for covered opinions are set forth in 31 C.F.R. 
§ 10.35(c) (2010).  
18. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(i) (2010).  Relevant facts that must be considered may 
include facts that “relate to future events if a transaction is prospective or proposed.”  Id. 
19. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(ii) (2010).  As described under Circular 230, “[a] factual 
assumption includes reliance on a projection, financial forecast or appraisal.”  Id.  Therefore, 
Circular 230 provides that “[i]t is unreasonable for a practitioner to rely on a projection, 
financial forecast or appraisal if the practitioner knows or should know that the projection, 
financial forecast or appraisal is incorrect or incomplete or was prepared by a person lacking 
the skills or qualifications necessary to prepare such projection, financial forecast or 
appraisal.”  Id. 
20. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(iii) (2010). 
21. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(ii) (2010). 
22. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(iii) (2010). 
23. See id.; 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(ii) (2010).   




Once the practitioner appropriately identifies the relevant facts, he 
or she must relate the applicable law to those facts.24  In so doing, the 
practitioner not only must consider all relevant provisions of the Code and 
the Treasury regulations thereunder, but must also take into account any 
“potentially applicable judicial doctrines.”25  With certain limited 
exceptions,26 the practitioner “must not assume the favorable resolution of 
any significant Federal tax issue,”27 and he or she may not “otherwise base 
an opinion on any unreasonable legal assumptions, representations, or 
conclusions.”28  Moreover, the practitioner’s opinion “must not contain 
internally inconsistent legal analyses or conclusions.”29 
Unless the opinion is a “limited scope opinion” as defined under 
Circular 230 § 10.35(c)(3)(v)(A),30 and except to the extent that the 
practitioner permissibly relies on the legal opinion of another practitioner 
with respect to certain matters,31 “[t]he opinion must consider all significant 
Federal tax issues,”32 and it “must provide the practitioner’s conclusion as 
to the likelihood that the taxpayer will prevail on the merits with respect to 
each significant Federal tax issue” so considered.33  In the text of the 
opinion, the practitioner must describe the reasons for his or her 
conclusions, “including the facts and analysis supporting the conclusions” 
or, alternatively, he or she must “describe the reasons that the practitioner is 
                                                 
24. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(2)(i) (2010). 
25. Id. 
26. In certain circumstances, a practitioner is permitted to deliver opinions that are 
limited to the consideration of fewer than all significant federal tax issues, and practitioners 
may also (within certain limits) rely on the legal opinions of others with respect to some 
significant federal tax issues.  For further discussion of Limited Scope Opinions and 
permitted reliance on opinions of others, see infra notes 30-31. 
27. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(2)(ii) (2010). 
28. Id. 
29. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(2)(iii) (2010). 
30. Circular 230 permits a practitioner to provide written advice on a transaction that 
covers fewer than all significant tax issues related to the transaction (a “Limited Scope 
Opinion”) if (1) the taxpayer and the petitioner agree as to the scope of the opinion and (2) 
they agree that the taxpayer may rely on the opinion for purposes of defending against the 
assessment of penalties imposed by the Code only with regard to the tax issues actually 
addressed in the opinion.  See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(v)(A)(1) (2010).  A Limited Scope 
Opinion is not permissible, however, if the transaction to which the opinion relates is a 
Listed Transaction or a Principal Purpose Transaction or if the opinion is otherwise a 
“marketed opinion.”  See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(v)(A)(2) (2010).  Any Limited Scope 
Opinion must contain a legend stating that, “[w]ith respect to any significant Federal tax 
issues outside the limited scope of the opinion, the opinion was not written, and cannot be 
used by the taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding penalties that may be imposed on the 
taxpayer.”  31 C.F.R. § 10.35(e)(3)(iii) (2010). 
31. In rendering his or her covered opinion, a “practitioner may rely on the opinion of 
another practitioner with respect to one or more significant Federal tax issues” as long as he 
or she “identif[ies] the other opinion and . . . the conclusions reached” therein, unless “the 
practitioner knows or should know that the opinion of the other practitioner should not be 
relied on.”  31 C.F.R. § 10.35(d)(1) (2010). 
32. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(i) (2010).  For a description of what constitutes a 
“significant Federal tax issue” under Circular 230, see supra note 8. 
33. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(ii) (2010). 
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unable to reach a conclusion as to one or more issues.”34  If an opinion fails 
to reach a conclusion at a confidence level of at least more-likely-than-not 
that the taxpayer will prevail on the merits with respect to one or more 
significant federal tax issues, the opinion must highlight that fact and must 
prominently state that the taxpayer cannot use the opinion to avoid the 
imposition of penalties arising from those issues.35  When evaluating a 
taxpayer’s chance of success on the merits as to any significant federal tax 
issue addressed in the opinion, the practitioner is specifically prohibited 
from considering “the possibility that a tax return will not be audited, that 
an issue will not be raised on audit, or that an issue will be resolved through 
settlement if raised.”36  A practitioner may not provide a “marketed 
opinion” at all unless he or she is able to conclude with a confidence level 
of at least more-likely-than-not that the taxpayer will prevail on the merits 
with respect to each significant federal tax issue arising from the transaction 
to which the opinion relates.37 
Finally, a covered opinion must include “the practitioner's overall 
conclusion as to the likelihood that the Federal tax treatment [that the 
taxpayer is taking] of the transaction or matter that is the subject of the 
opinion is the proper treatment,” and the practitioner must describe in the 
opinion his or her “reasons for that conclusion.”38  Alternatively, if a 
practitioner cannot reach such an overall conclusion, the opinion may 
generally contain a statement to that effect and, in that case, it must include 
an explanation “for the practitioner's inability to reach a conclusion.”39  If 
the opinion is a “marketed opinion,” however, failing to reach such a 
conclusion is not an option.  For any “marketed opinion,” not only must the 
practitioner reach a conclusion “that the Federal tax treatment of the 
transaction or matter that is the subject of the opinion is the proper 
treatment,” he or she must do so at a confidence level of at least more-
likely-than-not.40 
The sanctions that may be levied against practitioners who violate 
the Covered Opinion Regulations are severe.  “[T]he IRS has the ability to 
censure, disbar, or suspend a tax advisor from practice before the IRS, and 
may impose monetary penalties for noncompliance with [those] 
regulations.”41  Circular 230 § 10.50 provides that the Secretary of the 
                                                 
34. Id.  “If the practitioner is unable to reach a conclusion with respect to one or more 
[significant federal tax] issues, the opinion must state that the practitioner is unable to reach 
a conclusion with respect to those issues. . . . If the practitioner fails to reach a conclusion at 
a confidence level of at least more likely than not with respect to one or more significant 
Federal tax issues considered, the opinion must include the appropriate disclosure(s) 
required under” Circular 230.  Id.  The provisions concerning such disclosures are contained 
in 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(e). 
35. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(4) (2010), 31 C.F.R. §10.35(e)(4) (2010).  
36. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(iii) (2010). 
37. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(iv) (2010). 
38. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(4)(i) (2010). 
39. Id. 
40. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(4)(ii) (2010). 
41. Weiser, supra note 15, at 37. 




Treasury (and, by extension, the IRS, as his or her delegate) may exercise 
the general authority to “censure, suspend, or disbar any practitioner from 
practice before the [IRS] if the practitioner . . . fails to comply with any 
regulation” within Circular 230, including (without limitation) the Covered 
Opinion Regulations.42  Circular 230 § 10.52 further provides that “[a] 
practitioner may be sanctioned  . . . [for w]illfully violat[ing]” virtually any 
of the Circular 230 regulations,43  or for violating the Covered Opinion 
Regulations, in particular, either “[r]ecklessly or through gross 
incompetence.”44 
In addition to these sanctions, the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004 (the “JOBS Act”),45 “permit[s] the IRS to impose monetary penalties 
on a tax practitioner” for violations of the Covered Opinion Regulations.46  
“The amount of the monetary penalty can be as much as 100 percent of the 
gross income derived from the conduct giving rise to the penalty.  In other 
words, the IRS can penalize a lawyer for an amount equal to the gross fees 
received from the provision of the tax advice to the client.”47  Furthermore, 
if the practitioner who provides the sanctionable advice does so on behalf of 
a firm (or on behalf of any other employer or other entity for which the 
practitioner acts as agent), and if that firm or other entity knew or 
reasonably should have known of the practitioner’s conduct, then the firm 
or other entity is also subject to the same monetary penalties.48 
                                                 
42. 31 C.F.R. § 10.50(a) (2010).  “Censure,” as referred to in § 10.50, “is a public 
reprimand.”  Id. 
43. 31 C.F.R. § 10.52(a)(1) (2010).  Circular 230 § 10.52(a)(1) specifically excludes 
impositions of sanctions for willful violations of Circular 230 § 10.33, which sets forth 
aspirational (rather than mandatory) best practices for tax advisors.  
44. 31 C.F.R. § 10.52(a)(2) (2010).  Circular 230 § 10.52 was added as part of a 
substantial set of amendments to Circular 230 contained in final regulations that the 
Secretary adopted in December 2004 (the “December 2004 Amendments”) (published at 69 
Fed. Reg. 75,839-45 (Dec. 20, 2004)).  It is unclear whether the “willful, reckless or gross 
incompetence” standard established under that section sets a minimum threshold for the 
imposition of sanctions for violations of the Covered Opinion Regulations, or whether 
sanctions may be imposed for any such violation (even if the violation is not due to 
willfulness, recklessness or gross incompetence) pursuant to Circular 230 § 10.50.  On one 
hand, § 10.50 obviously cannot be ignored; on the other hand, if § 10.52 does not establish 
such a threshold as to what constitutes sanctionable conduct, then § 10.52 would seem to be 
largely superfluous in light of the preexisting authority to sanction under § 10.50. 
45. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004). 
46. Linda Z. Swartz & Jean Marie Bertrand, Circular 230 and Tax Shelters in 2008, 
857 PLI/Tax 193, 251 (Feb. 2009) (citing § 882(b) of the JOBS Act, amending 31 U.S.C. 
§ 330(b)). 
47. Weiser, supra note 15, at 37 (footnote omitted) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 330(b)). 
48. See Swartz & Bertrand, supra note 46, at 251; Weiser, supra note 15, at 37.  
“[F]actors that may be relevant to determining whether a monetary penalty should 
appropriately be imposed on an employer include (i) the gravity of the misconduct, (ii) any 
history of noncompliance by the employer, (iii) preventative measures in effect prior to the 
misconduct’s occurrence, and (iv) any corrective measures taken by the employer after it 
discovers the misconduct.”  Swartz & Bertrand, supra note 46, at 252 n.226 (citing Notice 
2007-39, 2007-20 I.R.B. 1243). 
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When providing a Significant Purpose Transaction opinion that is 
either a “reliance opinion” or a “marketed opinion,” a practitioner can opt 
out of the requirement to follow the Covered Opinion Regulations if he or 
she prominently49 places certain disclaimers on the opinion.  Written advice 
concerning a Significant Purpose Transaction that otherwise comes within 
the definition of a “reliance opinion”50 will not be treated as such for 
purposes of the regulations “if the practitioner prominently discloses in the 
written advice that it was not intended or written by the practitioner to be 
used, and that it cannot be used by the taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding 
penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer.”51  (Such a disclosure is 
referred to herein as a “Non-Reliance Disclaimer.”) 
Advice that would otherwise constitute a “marketed opinion”52 
concerning a Significant Purpose Transaction will not be treated as such 
under the regulations if it prominently contains both a Non-Reliance 
Disclaimer and a disclosure to the effect that “[t]he advice was written to 
support the promotion or marketing of the transaction(s) or matter(s) 
addressed by the written advice [and that the] taxpayer should seek advice 
based on the taxpayer's particular circumstances from an independent tax 
advisor.”53  A practitioner cannot opt out of compliance with the Covered 
Opinion Regulations by including a Non-Reliance Disclaimer (or by any 
other means) if he or she provides a Listed Transaction opinion, a Principal 
Purpose Transaction opinion or a Significant Purpose Transaction opinion 
that is either subject to conditions of confidentiality or subject to 
contractual protection.54 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF, AND PURPOSE BEHIND, CIRCULAR 
230’S COVERED OPINION REGULATIONS. 
Under 31 U.S.C. § 330, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized 
to regulate the practice of tax representatives before the Treasury 
Department.55  In 1966, pursuant to that grant of authority, the Secretary 
                                                 
49. The standards for “prominent” disclosure are set forth in Circular 230 
§ 10.35(b)(8). 
50. For the definition of “reliance opinion” under Circular 230, see supra note 8.  
51. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2010). 
52. For the definition of “marketed opinion” under Circular 230, see supra note 9. 
53. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(5)(ii) (2010). 
54. Provisions specifying that written advice will not be treated as a covered opinion if 
the appropriate disclaimers are prominently included are set forth in the definitions of 
“reliance opinion” and “marketed opinion” and those provisions expressly do not apply in 
the context of opinions concerning either Listed Transactions or Principal Purpose 
Transactions.  See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(b)(4)(ii) and 10.35(b)(5)(ii) (2010).  No similar rules 
for excepting written advice from the scope of the “covered opinion” definition exist in the 
provisions governing Listed Transaction opinions or Principal Purpose Transaction opinions, 
nor do they exist within the provisions for opinions subject to conditions of confidentiality or 
to contractual protection.  See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A), 10.35(b)(2)(i)(B), 10.35(b)(6), 
and 10.35(b)(7) (2010). 
55. Weiser, supra note 15, at 29 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 330). 




promulgated Circular 230, at 31 C.F.R. part 10.56  The general purpose of 
Circular 230 is to set forth rules (1) governing the authority of attorneys, 
certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and other persons to represent 
clients before IRS, (2) prescribing duties and restrictions of such persons in 
their practice before the IRS, and (3) providing for discipline of any such 
persons who violate those duties or restrictions.57  Since they were 
originally published, the Circular 230 regulations have been amended a 
number of times.58   
The most recent significant amendments to Circular 230 are 
contained in final regulations that the Secretary adopted in December 2004 
(the “December 2004 Amendments”).59  The December 2004 Amendments 
added a number of regulations that establish “aspirational standards of tax 
practice and . . . standards and requirements concerning the provision of tax 
advice.”60  Among those added standards and requirements are the Covered 
Opinion Regulations.  While those additions arguably would have exceeded 
the Secretary’s original regulatory authority pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 330, 
the Secretary was granted specific authority to promulgate the Covered 
Opinion Regulations and the other December 2004 Amendments by the 
JOBS Act,61 which President Bush signed into law in October 2004.62  
Section 822(b) of the JOBS Act added 31 U.S.C. § 330(d), “which provides 
that ‘[n]othing . . . shall be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary 
of the Treasury to impose standards applicable to the rendering of written 
advice . . . which is of a type which the Secretary determines as having a 
potential for tax avoidance or evasion.’”63  At the time when the JOBS Act 
became law, Treasury had already issued proposed regulations in 2003 that 
largely mirrored the final December 2004 Amendments.64  Thus, the JOBS 
Act “merely codified what the Secretary had already expressed an intention 
                                                 
56. See Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Jaime Vasquez, Section 10.35(B)(4)(II) of Circular 230 
Is Invalid (But Just in Case It Is Valid, Please ote That You Cannot Rely on This Article to 
Avoid the Imposition of Penalties), 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 293, 298 (2007); Weiser, supra 
note 15, at 29. 
57. 31 C.F.R. § 10.0 (2010) (Scope of part). 
58. See Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 298; Weiser, supra note 15, at 29. 
59. 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839-45 (Dec. 20, 2004) (cited in Weiser, supra note 15, at 29 n.5 
and Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 298 n.28). 
60. Weiser, supra note 15, at 29. 
61. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822(b), 118 Stat. 
1418 (2004).  The grant of such authority apparently was intended to extend only to 
regulations governing opinions specifically regarding tax shelters, however.  See infra note 
139 and accompanying text. 
62. See Weiser, supra note 15, at 29; Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 299-300. 
63. Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 300 (quoting Pub. L. No. 108-357, 
§ 822(b), 118 Stat. 1418, 1587 (2004)). 
64. Those proposed regulations were published at 68 Fed. Reg. 75,186 (proposed Dec. 
30, 2003). 
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to do; that is, regulate the issuance of tax advice with regard to tax shelter 
transactions.”65 
Indeed, the purpose behind the Covered Opinion Regulations and 
the other December 2004 Amendments is to “combat tax shelters and 
enhance public ‘confidence in the honesty and integrity’ of tax 
professionals.”66  The objective of the Covered Opinion Regulations, in 
particular, “was to limit the use of opinion letters in tax shelter offerings.”67  
More specifically, the Covered Opinion Regulations “are intended to deter 
taxpayers from engaging in abusive transactions by limiting or eliminating 
their ability to avoid penalties through inappropriate reliance on a tax 
advisor’s advice.”68  To accomplish this, the regulations seek to “make it 
more burdensome for tax professionals to provide written opinions that 
clients can use in attempting to avoid monetary penalties when their daring 
attempts to save tax are disallowed.”69  In addition, the Covered Opinion 
Regulations “are aimed at preventing unscrupulous tax advisors and 
promoters from marketing abusive transactions to large numbers of 
customers . . . based on an opinion that fails to consider adequately the facts 
of the particular transaction.”70  In this regard, the regulations are 
particularly concerned with discouraging tax attorneys and other tax 
advisors “from actively promoting aggressive tax avoidance strategies . . . 
to persons who are not their existing clients.”71 
III. THE TAX SHELTER MARKET AND THE PARTICIPATION OF 
ATTORNEYS IN ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS, WHICH GAVE RISE TO 
THE COVERED OPINION REGULATIONS. 
Treasury and the IRS were spurred to bolster their efforts to combat 
abusive transactions by the marked increase in tax shelter72 activity during 
                                                 
65. Weiser, supra note 15, at 29 (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 75,186, 75,186-87 (proposed 
Dec. 30, 2003). 
66. Deborah L. Paul, ew York State Bar Association Tax Section Report on Circular 
230, reprinted at 794 PLI/TAX 9, 15 (Oct.-Nov. 2007) (quoting preamble to the December 
2004 Amendments). 
67. Deborah H. Schenk, The Circular 230 Amendments: Time to Throw Them Out and 
Start Over, 110 TAX NOTES 1311, 1312 (Mar. 20, 2006) (citation omitted). 
68. Paul, supra note 66, at 15. 
69. Casey R. Law, The Circular File: Dealing With the 2005 Amendments to Treasury 
Department Circular 230 Without Contracting Disclaimer Mania, 76 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 24, 
25 (Sept. 2007). 
70. Paul, supra note 66, at 15. 
71. Law, supra note 69, at 25. 
72. One reason why tax shelters are so challenging to regulate is that they are difficult 
to define.  The Code’s definition of “tax shelter” is in § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii).  That definition 
has been criticized as less than illuminating, because it is too broad and imprecise to provide 
proper guidance as to whether a particular transaction falls inside or outside of its scope.  
Indeed, it is possible to construe the definition as capturing a wide range of deals that it 
presumably was not intended to cover.  The definition includes any plan or arrangement for 
which a “significant purpose” is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax, and that 
description arguably applies to almost “anything a tax lawyer advises a client to do.”  Scott 




the 1990s.  Although a large tax shelter market initially developed during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress “effectively eradicated the first 
wave of tax shelters” in 1986, when it passed the Code provisions that 
prohibit offsetting ordinary income against passive losses.73  Those tax 
shelters, however, were targeted primarily to middle-income individuals.74  
Accordingly, the passive loss reforms did little to slow the growth of the 
market for corporate tax shelters, which flourished over the decade that 
followed.75 
The rise of the corporate tax shelter market stemmed in part from 
the fact that, during the 1990s, corporate tax departments came under 
increasing pressure not only to perform traditional legal compliance 
functions, but also to become profit centers.76  As corporate managements 
searched for evermore ways to reduce expenses, the drive to find new 
methods to decrease their firms’ tax liabilities garnered added attention.  
Simply put, “[u]nder a basic cost-benefit analysis, purchasing tax shelters 
made sense financially.”77 
At the same time, changes in the legal and accounting industries in 
the 1990s increased the willingness of tax attorneys and accountants to 
participate in the development and promotion of corporate tax shelters.78  
Law firms “became more entrepreneurial, and ‘consulting’ became one of 
the largest parts of accounting firm practices.”79  As they increased their 
focus on consulting, the big accounting firms became among the most 
active promoters of corporate tax shelters.  They developed complex 
shelters and marketed them to literally hundreds of clients on a 
contingency-fee basis (the fee being based on the amount of tax saved), 
often making tens of millions of dollars on a single shelter.80  Lawyers who 
refrained from participating directly in the development and marketing of 
tax shelters, nevertheless participated in the profits by providing opinion 
                                                                                                                 
A. Schumacher, Maciven v. Westmoreland and Tax Advice: Using “Purposive Textualism” 
to Deal with Tax Shelters and Promote Legitimate Tax Advice, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 33, 58 
(2008).  An often-quoted, more colloquial “tax shelter” definition was introduced by 
Professor Michael Graetz.  Professor Graetz famously described a tax shelter as “‘[a] deal 
done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid.’”  Id. at 57-
58 (citation omitted).  While that definition well reflects the spirit of what a tax shelter is, it 
too is of limited help in determining whether a particular transaction constitutes a shelter. 
73. Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter 
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 83 (2006).  
74. Id.  See also Schumacher, supra note 72, at 55 (in contrast to current tax shelters, 
which “are invested in by high net-worth individuals and corporations . . . the shelters of the 
1970s were invested in by thousands of individuals, including middle-class taxpayers”); 
CAMILLA E. WATSON & BROOKS D. BILLMAN, JR., FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE—CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 137 (2005) (discussing “mass-marketing 
of tax shelters to middle class Americans” in the 1970s).  
75. See Rostain, supra note 73, at 83. 
76. See id. at 86. 
77. Id. 
78. See Schumacher, supra note 72, at 53. 
79. Id. 
80. See Rostain, supra note 73, at 88. 
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letters with respect to the shelters promoted by the accountants.81  “At the 
height of the shelter market, fees for opinion letters ran into the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, with some even commanding $1 million or more.”82 
The prospect of such enormous fees made the temptation to traffic 
in questionable, overly-aggressive tax advice simply too great to resist for a 
surprisingly large number of professionals.83  While earlier tax shelter 
activity had previously been confined largely to professionals “at the 
periphery” of their professions, advisors involved in the more recent 
shelters “worked for some of the most prestigious accounting and law 
firms.”84  This unholy alliance between prominent attorneys and 
accountants produced a rapid proliferation of more sophisticated,85 more 
potentially lucrative,86 and arguably more abusive corporate tax shelters 
than had ever been seen before.87 
The success of these dubious enterprises depended particularly on 
the provision of the tax attorneys’ legal opinions.  Attorneys’ opinions have 
long been considered to be essential elements of such schemes because, up 
until now, they have effectively operated as insurance policies against 
penalties that might otherwise have been assessable under the Code against 
tax shelter investors if the investors’ reported losses from the shelters are 
disallowed.88  If a taxpayer relies on an attorney’s legal opinion in taking a 
reporting position that ultimately results in an underpayment of tax, the 
opinion is generally considered to provide reasonable cause for the 
underpayment (provided that the opinion meets certain minimum 
requirements under applicable Treasury regulations), and the taxpayer’s 
reliance thereon is generally considered to constitute action in good faith 
with respect to the underpayment, for purposes of invoking the exception 
under § 6664(c)(1)89 to the imposition of a 20% accuracy-related penalty 
                                                 
81. See id. at 92. 
82. Id. at 94 (citations omitted). 
83. See Schumacher, supra note 72, at 53. 
84. Id. at 55. 
85. See, e.g., id. at 53-54 (discussing newly developed corporate finance techniques, 
such as new financial instruments, special-purpose entities and off-shore arrangements used 
to facilitate corporate tax shelters). 
86. See id. at 55 (noting that magnitude of losses claimed by investors in more recent 
tax shelters “dwarfs” losses generated by 1970s shelters, and citing examples). 
87. See generally Rostain, supra note 73, at 88-94 (outlining “the rise of the tax shelter 
market” during the 1990s, providing examples of notable abusive corporate shelters of the 
period, and discussing the respective roles of attorneys and accountants in the development 
of the market); Meah Rothman Tell, Circular 230: Beware the Jabberwock!, 80 FLA. B. J. 39 
(2006) (discussing several high-profile examples of abusive tax shelters promoted by 
prominent accounting firms and supported by the legal opinions of prominent law firms); 
Schumacher, supra note 72, at 53-56 (describing “the rise of mega tax shelters” and the 
participation of attorneys and accountants therein).  
88. See Rostain, supra note 73, at 92-93; Schenk, supra note 67, at 1312. 
89. Section 6664(c)(1) of the Code provides that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed under 
section 6662 or 6663 with respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there 
was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with 
respect to such portion.”  I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2010).  Treasury regulation § 1.6664-4 sets 




for underpayments under § 666290 or the 75% fraud penalty under § 6663.91  
(Similarly, with certain exceptions, reliance on certain legal opinions can be 
asserted to invoke the heightened reasonable-cause-and-good-faith 
exception to the 20% accuracy-related penalty under § 6662A(a)92 that has 
applied since 2004 to understatements arising from “reportable 
transactions”93). 
                                                                                                                 
forth rules for whether the reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exception applies in particular 
circumstances.  In general, the rules provide for a facts-and-circumstances-based 
determination.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (2010).  There are special rules, however, for 
determining whether the exception applies in the case of substantial understatement penalties 
attributable to tax shelter items of corporations.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f) (2010).  In 
addition to the general facts-and-circumstances test, those special rules expressly provide 
that that reasonable cause may be established through reliance in good faith on the opinion 
of a professional tax advisor, but only if that opinion meets certain minimum requirements.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2) (2010). 
90. Section 6662 of the Code provides, inter alia, for the imposition of a penalty in the 
amount of 20% of any portion of an underpayment of tax that is attributable to “negligence” 
(as defined in § 6662(c)) or a “substantial understatement of income tax” (as defined in 
§ 6662(d)).  See I.R.C. § 6662 (2010).   
91. Section 6663 of the Code provides for the imposition of a penalty in the amount of 
75% of any portion of an underpayment of tax that is attributable to fraud.  See I.R.C. 
§ 6663(a) (2010).  
92. Section 6662A(a) of the Code provides for the imposition of a penalty in the 
amount of 20% of any portion of a “reportable transaction understatement.”  See I.R.C. 
§ 6662A(a) (2010).  A “reportable transaction understatement” is an underpayment of tax 
that results from or is facilitated by a reportable transaction, as calculated according to a 
formula set forth in § 6662A(b).  See I.R.C. § 6662A(b)(1) (2010).  Under § 6664(d) of the 
Code, a penalty under § 6662A will not be imposed “with respect to any portion of a 
reportable transaction understatement if it is shown that there was a reasonable cause for 
such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such portion.”  See 
I.R.C. § 6664(d)(1) (2010).  However, to fall within this protection, a taxpayer must meet 
certain requirements that make the reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exception to the 
§ 6662A penalty somewhat more stringent than the reasonable-cause-and-good-faith 
exception to the § 6662 and § 6663 penalties provided by § 6664(c)(1) and the Treasury 
regulations thereunder.  The § 6664(d) requirements include that (a) the taxpayer adequately 
disclosed the reportable transaction in question, (b) there was substantial authority for the 
taxpayer’s tax treatment of the reportable transaction, and (c) the taxpayer reasonably 
believed that such treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment.  See I.R.C. 
§ 6664(d)(3) (2010).  The rules relating to what constitutes a “reasonable belief” in this 
context, including rules specifically addressing legal opinions on which reliance can and 
cannot be placed, are set forth in § 6664(d)(4).  See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4) (2010).  
Notwithstanding the general rule of § 6664(d)(1), no reasonable cause exception to the 
imposition of a § 6662A(a) penalty is available in the case of any portion of a reportable 
transaction understatement that arises from a transaction to which a § 6662(b)(6) penalty 
applies because the transaction lacks economic substance under the newly-codified 
economic substance doctrine.  See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2) (2010).  For a discussion of the recent 
codification of the economic substance doctrine, see infra note 99 and accompanying text.  
For a discussion of the related strict liability penalty for transactions without economic 
substance, see infra notes 187-99 and accompanying text. 
93. A “reportable transaction” is defined under the Code as a transaction with respect 
to which information must be included on a participant’s tax return because the Secretary 
has determined, pursuant to regulations prescribed under § 6011, that the transaction has “a 
potential for tax avoidance or evasion.”  I.R.C. § 6707A(c)(1) (2010).  In accordance with 
those regulations, the IRS has promulgated a list of categories of reportable transactions, as 
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Of course, there traditionally have been certain exceptions to the 
availability of legal opinions as penalty defenses, and those exceptions are 
likely to increase in the future.  Since 2004, one exception has been that 
reliance on a legal opinion cannot provide a defense against imposition of 
the 30% penalty under § 6662A(c) that applies to understatements related to 
undisclosed reportable transactions.94  Moreover, as discussed further 
below, the extent to which reliance on a legal opinion will be grounds for a 
reasonable-cause-and-good-faith defense against accuracy-related penalties 
asserted in any future tax shelter case has recently been called into some 
question by the March 2010 enactment of the § 6662(b)(6) strict liability 
penalty with respect to transactions that contravene the newly-codified 
economic substance doctrine.95  Nevertheless, the ability to invoke reliance 
on a legal opinion as a part of a defense against penalties certainly has been, 
and potentially will continue to be, 96 a significant consideration for 
investors contemplating participation in tax shelters. 
                                                                                                                 
to which a participant must disclose information on a Form 8886 filed together with the 
participant’s return.  The categories of reportable transactions are:  Listed Transactions, 
transactions subject to conditions of confidentiality, transactions subject to contractual 
protections, loss transactions (i.e., transactions that generate losses in excess of certain 
specified thresholds, which vary depending on whether the claimant of the loss is an 
individual, corporation or partnership), and so-called transactions of interest (which are 
transactions that the same as, or substantially similar to, ones that the IRS has specifically 
identified as having potential for tax avoidance or evasion).  See IRS Instructions for Form 
8886 (Rev. Mar. 2010) (Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement) at 1-3.    
94. Section 6662A(c) of the Code provides (or, at least, is intended to provide) for the 
imposition of a penalty in the amount of 30% of any portion of a reportable transaction 
understatement arising from a reportable transaction that the taxpayer did not adequately 
disclose in accordance with regulations under § 6011 (i.e., a transaction that was not 
disclosed on a Form 8886).  Specifically, § 6662A(c) provides that the 30% penalty applies 
“to the portion of any reportable transaction understatement with respect to which the 
requirement of section 6664(d)(2)(A) is not met.”   I.R.C. § 6662A(c) (2010).  Prior to 
March 30, 2010, § 6664(d)(2)(A) referenced the requirement for adequate disclosure, in 
accordance with regulations prescribed under § 6011, of relevant facts affecting the tax 
treatment of an item of income.  However, as a result of amendments to § 6664(d) that 
became effective on March 30, 2010 in connection with the codification of the economic 
substance doctrine, the former § 6664(d)(2)(A) was redesignated as § 6664(d)(3)(A).  
Compare I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(A) (as amended in 2010), with I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(A) (2009).  
In what was presumably a drafting oversight in connection with the March 30, 2010 
amendments, the cross-reference in § 6662A(c) was not updated accordingly.  Nevertheless, 
the context makes clear that the 30% penalty is still intended to apply to reportable 
transaction understatements arising from transactions that were not adequately disclosed 
pursuant to § 6011.  (For a description of what constitutes a “reportable transaction 
understatement,” see supra note 92).  The penalty under § 6662A(c) is a strict liability 
penalty.  The reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exception under § 6664(d) is expressly 
inapplicable in cases where the reportable transaction at issue was not adequately disclosed.  
See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(A) (2010).  This abolition of, inter alia, “penalty protection for 
opinion letters in connection with reportable tax shelters that are not properly disclosed and 
are later found to be abusive” was enacted in 2004 as part of the JOBS Act.  Rostain, supra 
note 73, at 108 (citations omitted). 
95. See infra notes 187-99 and accompanying text. 
96. See infra text accompanying notes 194-99 (discussing potential limits in the IRS’s 
application of § 6662(b)(6) and the corresponding potential for remaining vitality of other 




  To arrive at a level of comfort they needed in order to deliver 
opinions on the overly aggressive transactions that they were blessing, tax 
attorneys in the 1990s often used techniques that skirted the boundaries of 
sound professional judgment, if not professional ethics.97  First, they 
adopted a hyper-textual approach to the construction and application of the 
tax laws.  That is, they focused solely on whether the proposed tax 
treatment of a given transaction could technically be argued to come within 
the literal terms of the Code, without taking account of the legislative 
history or purpose of the provisions in question, and without giving effect 
to judicially-created anti-abuse doctrines such as the business purpose and 
economic substance doctrines.98  (The economic substance doctrine was 
                                                                                                                 
accuracy-related penalties—which have reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exceptions—in the 
tax shelter context). 
97. Prior to the Covered Opinion Regulations under Circular 230, the only 
professional ethical guidance to attorneys specifically in relation to tax shelter opinions was 
found in the American Bar Association’s Formal Opinion 346, which was released in 1982.  
See A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 346 (1982).  A detailed analysis 
of Formal Opinion 346 is beyond the scope of this article.  For useful discussions of that 
opinion, see, e.g., David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and 
First Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 868-70 (2006); David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to 
Clients and Duties to Others—The Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the 
Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169, 182-84 (2009).  Though one may 
debate the theoretical superiority or inferiority of the standards set forth in Formal Opinion 
346 relative to the Covered Opinion Regulations, one conclusion is inescapable:  The 
aspirational standards in that opinion had been wholly ineffective at deterring the conduct 
described below. 
98. See Rostain, supra note 73, at 94; Schumacher, supra note 72, at 56.  The business 
purpose doctrine and the economic substance doctrine are among “a cluster of overlapping 
doctrines, dating back to the 1930s, that courts . . . developed to disallow the tax benefits of 
abusive transactions.”  Rostain, supra note 73, at 84-85.  (The substance-over-form and step-
transaction doctrines are also in this group).  “The economic substance doctrine was, if not 
formulated, then at least popularized by Learned Hand in the Second Circuit’s 1934 decision 
of Gregory v. Helvering.”  David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 
52 TAX LAW. 235, 241 (1999) (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), 
aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)).  That doctrine has since “played a particularly important role in 
the government’s fight against corporate tax shelters.”  Joseph Bankman, The Economic 
Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 6 (2000).  The doctrine’s basic premise “is that a 
court may deny the tax benefits achieved by a business transaction where the transaction 
itself lacks any economic benefit without regard to the tax benefits.”  Jeffrey C. Glickman & 
Clark R. Calhoun, The “States” of the Federal Common Law Tax Doctrines, 61 TAX LAW. 
1181, 1183 (2008).  In one often cited case, the Tax Court explained the economic substance 
doctrine as follows:  
The tax law . . . requires that the intended transactions have economic substance 
separate and distinct from economic benefit achieved solely by tax reduction. The 
doctrine of economic substance becomes applicable, and a judicial remedy is 
warranted, where a taxpayer seeks to claim tax benefits, unintended by Congress, by 
means of transactions that serve no economic purposes other than tax savings. 
ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2215 (1989), aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999) (quoted in Glickman 
& Calhoun, supra note 98 at 1183).  Thus, the doctrine dictates that a transaction will not be 
recognized for tax purposes if it does not provide a potential for economic gain to the 
taxpayer—apart from any tax considerations or consequences.  See Rostain, supra note 73, 
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codified on March 30, 2010, at § 7701(o) of the Code.99  Prior to that time, 
it was strictly a common-law doctrine.)  Indeed, the attorneys’ opinions 
often contained express qualifications such as, “‘in giving this opinion, we 
do not consider the application of the doctrines of economic substance and 
business purpose.’”100 
                                                                                                                 
at 85.  The economic substance doctrine consists of two “separate, but interrelated, 
inquiries.”  Bankman, supra note 98 at 9 (citing ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 247-48).  The first 
inquiry is an objective test that focuses on “‘‘whether the transaction has any practical 
economic effects other than the creation of income tax losses.’’”  Id. (quoting ACM P’ship, 
157 F.3d at 248 (quoting Jacobson v. Comm’r, 915 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1990))).  The 
second inquiry “explicitly incorporates the business purpose doctrine.”  Bankman, supra 
note 98 at 9.  The business purpose doctrine “is the subjective inquiry into the taxpayer’s 
intent to enter into a transaction, and a taxpayer must show that it had an independent non-
tax purpose for the transaction.”  Glickman & Calhoun, supra note 98, at 1189.  In other 
words, the business purpose doctrine asks:  Does the taxpayer have a reason—other than tax 
avoidance—for doing the deal?  In short, the transaction will be respected for tax purposes 
only if the answer is “yes.”  See Rostain, supra note 73, at 85.  Over time, courts developed 
differing views as to whether both the objective and subjective tests always need to be 
satisfied and whether to respect transactions that satisfy only one of the tests.  See Sarah B. 
Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1033 
(2009).  These inconsistencies sparked many calls for the codification of the doctrines over 
the years.  See Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389, 
391 (2010).  Ultimately, as discussed below, the economic substance doctrine was 
incorporated in the Code in March 2010.  In any event, the economic substance and business 
purpose doctrines reflect the fundamental theory that tax deductions under the Code “should 
apply only to activities aimed at income generation,” given that the basic aim of the Code is 
to “tax income minus the cost of generating it.”  Rostain, supra note 73, at 86 (citations 
omitted). 
99. Section 7701(o) of the Code, entitled “Clarification of Economic Substance 
Doctrine,” was added as part of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
which President Obama signed into law on March 30, 2010.  Section 7701(o) provides that 
“[i]n the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such 
transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only if—(A) the transaction 
changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s 
economic position, and (B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal 
income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.”  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (2010).  The new 
Code section defines “economic substance doctrine” as the “common law doctrine under 
which tax benefits . . . with respect to a transaction are not allowable if the transaction does 
not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose.”  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) (2010).  
The section specifically provides that the threshold question of “whether the economic 
substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner” as if the 
new law “had never been enacted.”  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (2010).  One commentator 
suggests that this latter provision “should mean that for the most part, the law has not 
changed.”  Monte A. Jackel, Dawn of a ew Era: Congress Codifies Economic Substance, 
129 TAX NOTES 289, 296 (Apr. 19, 2010).  However, an express requirement, in all cases, 
that the present value of a transaction’s reasonably expected pre-tax profit be “substantial” in 
relation to the present value of the transaction’s expected net tax benefits (see I.R.C. 
§ 7701(o)(2)(A) (2010)) is one change to the common law doctrine.  Jackel, 129 TAX NOTES 
at 296.  Moreover, because the new section does not define what constitutes a change “in a 
meaningful way” in a taxpayer’s economic position, or what constitutes a “substantial” 
purpose for entering into a transaction, it is too early to tell whether those concepts introduce 
any significant changes to the economic substance doctrine.  See id.  Section 7701(o) applies 
to transactions consummated after March 30, 2010.  
100. David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 362-63 (2006). 




Second, the attorneys frequently relied on unsupported or 
unreasonable factual assumptions or factual representations.101  Many 
times, these were general, unsubstantiated representations or assumptions 
that the transaction in question had a legitimate business purpose apart from 
tax considerations or that the transaction had the potential to produce 
economic profit before taking into account any tax effects.  For example, an 
attorney’s opinion would simply state something to the effect that, “‘in 
giving this opinion, we rely on your representation that there is a realistic 
possibility to make a pretax profit.’”102  Other times, there would just be a 
blanket assumption in the opinion (without any back-up) that all statements 
in the offering circular for the tax shelter were correct.103 
Third, the attorneys would sometimes render “partial opinions, ” in 
which they would address only some of the federal tax issues arising in a 
transaction.  They would speak to those issues as to which they could reach 
a favorable conclusion, and they would simply ignore those that were 
problematic or inconvenient (stating, in the process, that the opinion was 
limited solely to the matters expressly mentioned).104  Because most 
investors “tended to focus primarily on the opinion’s conclusion that the tax 
benefits were allowable,” they usually failed to consider the various 
qualifications and conditions upon which the opinions were rendered, and 
they were thus “misled into believing that the tax benefits were 
legitimate.”105 
It was in order to eliminate these practices, which had become so 
widespread and which had facilitated so many abusive tax shelters during 
the preceding decade, that the December 2004 Amendments to Circular 230 
introduced requirements for tax advisors to consider all relevant facts and to 
rely only on reasonable factual assumptions and representations, to relate 
all relevant law (including judicial anti-abuse doctrines) to those facts, and 
to address all pertinent federal tax issues, when providing covered 
opinions.106 
IV. THE MOST COMMON, AND MOST SIGNIFICANT, CRITICISMS OF 
THE COVERED OPINION REGULATIONS 
When the Covered Opinion Regulations were first announced, they 
were met with virtual screams of protest from practicing tax attorneys and 
tax law scholars, and that criticism has not abated in the years since the 
regulations took effect. 
 
                                                 
101. Id. at 362. 
102. Id. 
103. See  WATSON & BILLMAN, supra note 74, at 137. 
104. See id. at 138. 
105. Id. at 137. 
106. See Schizer, supra note 100, at 363. 
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A. The Regulations are Unduly Complex 
As an initial matter, even before considering the substance of the 
rules that the regulations impose, the language and organization of the 
Covered Opinion Regulations have been disparaged as unworkably 
complex.  Critics maintain that the regulations are unnecessarily 
complicated, “with numerous defined terms and overlapping standards and 
definitions.”107  They complain that, before providing any written advice to 
a client, an attorney must spend an inordinate amount of time sifting 
through various arcane regulatory provisions to try to figure out which 
categories his or her opinion may come within, which exceptions or opt-out 
provisions may be relevant, and which requirements therefore apply to his 
or her project.108  As a consequence, tax attorneys may actually have to 
spend more time deciphering the rules that govern their opinions than they 
spend considering the substance of the tax matters on which they are 
opining.109  According to the critics, simply forcing tax attorneys to focus 
so much time and attention on the form and procedure for opinion-giving, 
when they should instead be thinking about “real” tax issues, may itself 
diminish the quality of the advice that the attorneys ultimately provide.110     
 
B. The Regulations Impose Prohibitive Time and Cost Burdens 
From here, things only get worse according to the regulations’ 
many detractors.  Assume that a client asks to receive—or that an attorney 
determines that it would be prudent to provide—written advice with respect 
to a particular tax matter.  If, after combing through the Covered Opinion 
Regulations, a practitioner concludes that his or her written advice would 
constitute a covered opinion (as will very often be the case111), then the 
regulations require the practitioner to provide a full-blown opinion that 
satisfies the exacting due diligence and drafting standards set forth in 
Circular 230 § 10.35(c).112  Of course, if the advice constitutes a “reliance 
opinion” that relates to a Significant Purpose transaction, the practitioner 
can opt out of compliance with the § 10.35(c) regulations by including a 
prominent Non-Reliance Disclaimer in the opinion.113  However, while 
such disclaimers have become commonplace, there are significant 
                                                 
107. Schumacher, supra note 72, at 63. 
108. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 66, at 17-18. 
109. See id. at 18; Schumacher, supra note 72, at 63. 
110. See Schumacher, supra note 72, at 63; Paul, supra note 66, at 17-18. 
111. This is because virtually any written tax advice has the potential to come within 
the broad scope of a Significant Purpose Transaction opinion. 
112. See Weiser, supra note 15, at 29-30. 
113. For a description of what constitutes a “reliance opinion” under Circular 230, see 
supra note 8.  It is also possible to opt out of compliance with the Circular 230 § 10.35(c) 
regulations in the case of a “marketed opinion” that relates to a Significant Purpose 
transaction by including both a Non-Reliance Disclaimer and certain other disclaimers. For a 
description of what constitutes a “marketed opinion” under Circular 230, see supra note 9.  
For a description of the Covered Opinion Regulations’ opt-out provisions, see supra notes 
49-54 and accompanying text. 




drawbacks to them (as discussed further below).114  Moreover, the 
possibility of opting out of compliance with § 10.35(c) does not even exist 
in the case of opinions related to Listed Transactions or Principal Purpose 
Transactions.115 
The critics assert that meeting the § 10.35(c) standards greatly 
increases the time burden associated with providing such tax advice and, 
therefore, substantially increases the cost of such advice to clients.116  This, 
in turn, strains the relationship between tax attorneys and their clients.  For 
example, a client who wishes to receive succinct advice on a relatively 
routine tax planning matter will likely be upset to find that the brief e-mail 
response that he or she expected will instead have to be a several-page 
formal opinion, which will take far longer to produce and will cost far more 
when it finally arrives.117  Such experiences may cause clients to conclude 
“that they cannot rely on their practitioner to offer them advice without 
producing a document that is formalistic and expensive.” 118  As a result, in 
at least some instances, clients may become discouraged from seeking tax 
counsel in the first place.119 
 
C. The Regulations Impede Communication between Attorneys and 
Clients, and Prevent Delivery of Informal or Piecemeal Advice 
In addition to increasing the cost of tax advice in many instances, 
some critics charge that the Covered Opinion Regulations (and particularly 
the § 10.35(c) requirements) impede the normal flow of communications 
between tax attorneys and their transactional clients because they do not 
reflect how advice is actually rendered during the course of a deal.120  In 
short, the argument is that transactional advice—including tax advice—is 
typically requested and given piecemeal during the gestation of a deal, and 
the Covered Opinion Regulations make it harder to provide such advice in 
writing if the transaction in question is within the regulations’ wide ambit.  
Generally, a client’s first request for tax advice will not be a request for a 
comprehensive opinion addressing all tax issues in a deal, just prior to the 
transaction’s completion.  Instead, a client usually seeks advice in many 
stages, beginning when he or she first “noodles” over a deal’s structure and 
                                                 
114. See infra Part IV.F. 
115. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
116. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 15, at 29-30; Paul, supra note 66, at 17; Schenk, 
supra note 67, at 1315; Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 295. 
117. Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 316 (citing Richard M. Lipton, Attorney 
Comments on Proposed Circular 230 Amendments, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 48-41 (Mar. 
11, 2004). 
118. Edward F. Koren, ABA Section Members Comments on Circular 230 Regs., 2005 
TAX NOTES TODAY 90-23 (May 11, 2005) (quoted in Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 
316). 
119. See Schenk, supra note 67, at 1315; Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 316. 
120. See Paul, supra note 66, at 16, 26-31 (asserting that various examples of 
“informal” written tax advice should be excluded from the definition of a “covered 
opinion”). 
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continuing as different variations of the transaction are considered and as 
deal terms are added and deleted through negotiations.121  The tax questions 
that arise during this long process often involve significant but discrete 
issues (as opposed to encompassing all tax aspects of the deal); and they 
usually call for response that is considered (of course), but also prompt, 
succinct and informal.122 
The problem is that, if such a response is given in writing, and if 
the transaction is a Listed Transaction, a Principal Purpose Transaction or a 
Significant Purpose Transaction (and any deal which is not one of the first 
two will almost certainly be in the last category), then the brief, informal 
response on the discrete issue will have to meet all of the heightened due 
diligence and comprehensive drafting requirements of Circular 230 
§ 10.35(c).123  This is true even if the advice is in electronic form.124  As a 
result, “there is an increased incentive to use oral advice.”125  In at least 
some cases, this may be worse for the client because oral advice on 
complex tax issues is more susceptible to misunderstanding and because the 
client will be left without a “record” to consult later.126  Moreover, in 
today’s world, “advice that would in the past have been delivered orally is 
often transmitted by e-mail.”127  “[B]ecause the sender” and recipient “need 
not be present at the same time[,]” attorneys and clients alike often prefer e-
mails to oral communication, and e-mail has thus become one of the 
primary ways in which tax and other legal advice is given and received.128  
Of course, it is often possible to opt out of compliance with the regulations 
by adding a Non-Reliance Disclaimer to the message, and such disclaimers 
in attorneys’ e-mails have become ubiquitous.  Again, however, that option 
does not exist in every case, and the disclaimers themselves are not without 
their own problems.129 
 
D. The Regulations Prevent Practitioners from Exercising 
Professional Judgment in Distinguishing between Important and 
Unimportant Tax Issues 
Worse yet, as some commentators have pointed out, the Covered 
Opinion Regulations may prevent attorneys from providing at least one 
                                                 
121. See id. at 16. 
122. Id. at 16, 26. 
123. See generally 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(a) (2010), 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i) (2010).  But 
see 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(A) (2010) (containing an exception to this requirement if the 
advice in question constitutes preliminary advice). 
124.  “Electronic communications” are expressly included among the types of written 
advice that can be a “covered opinion” under Circular 230.  See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i) 
(2010). 
125. Schenk, supra note 67, at 1315. 
126. Id. 
127. Paul, supra note 66, at 26. 
128. Id. 
129. See infra text accompanying notes 152-56 (discussing problems with Non-
Reliance Disclaimers). 




particularly important component of tax advice at any price or in any form.  
Generally, a covered opinion must consider all “significant federal tax 
issues” and provide a conclusion as to the likelihood that the taxpayer will 
prevail on the merits with respect to each such issue.130  This general rule 
limits a practitioner’s discretion to confine his or her counsel to the issues 
that he or she believes to be of true and material concern.131   
For purposes of the Covered Opinion Regulations, a federal tax 
issue is “significant” if the IRS “has a reasonable basis for a successful 
challenge and its resolution could have a significant impact, whether 
beneficial or adverse and under any reasonably foreseeable circumstance, 
on the overall federal tax treatment of the transaction(s) or matter(s) 
addressed in the opinion.”132  This “reasonable basis” standard captures a 
much broader swath of tax issues than did the standard that applied under 
Circular 230 prior to the December 2004 Amendments.  Before those 
amendments, the former Circular 230 § 10.33 required tax opinions to 
address only those federal tax issues that were subject to “a reasonable 
possibility of challenge by the” IRS.133  As commentator David 
Moldenhauer explains, the prior standard thus “allowed a practitioner to 
exercise professional judgment in distinguishing between those issues that 
raised a possibility of challenge, and thus required discussion, and those 
that did not.”134 
“In contrast,” the current “reasonable basis standard” under 
Circular 230 § 10.35 “does not allow for such judgment.”135  Moldenhauer 
notes that, while the “reasonable basis standard” may be appropriate to the 
evaluation of whether a reporting position is sufficient to avoid penalties, 
employing that standard “to define the entire range of issues to be 
                                                 
130. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(i) and (ii) (2010).  For a description of what constitutes a 
“significant Federal tax issue” under Circular 230, see supra note 8. 
131. See Moldenhauer, supra note 97, at 860-61. As noted above, there are two 
exceptions to the general rule.  First, a practitioner may rely on the opinion of another 
practitioner with regard to some significant federal tax issues.  See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(d)(1) 
(2010).  Also, Limited Scope Opinions are permissible in some cases.  See 31 C.F.R. 
§ 10.35(c)(3)(v)(A) (2010).  For further discussion of a practitioner’s ability to rely on 
others’ opinions and further discussion of Limited Scope Opinions, see supra notes 30-31 
and accompanying text. 
132. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(3) (2010).  The regulations do not define what constitutes a 
“reasonable basis for a successful challenge” in this context.  Law, supra note 69, at 32.  
However, the Treasury regulations promulgated under § 6662 of the Code provide that, in 
the context of a defense against the imposition of an accuracy-related penalty for substantial 
underpayments of tax, “a ‘reasonable basis’ for a taxpayer’s position is a standard that is 
‘significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper.’”  Id. at 32 n.34 (quoting 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662(b)(3)).  Therefore, assuming that the IRS applies the “reasonable basis” 
standard in the same way under Circular 230, the standard “is not satisfied by a return 
position that is merely arguable or that is merely a colorable claim.”  Id. (quoting Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6662(b)(3)); see also Moldenhauer, supra note 97, at 860-61. 
133. Former 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(a)(4) (1984) (quoted in Moldenhauer, supra note 97, at 
861).  
134. Moldenhauer, supra note 97, at 861. 
135. Id. 
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considered in an opinion requires the practitioner to identify not merely the 
positions that the IRS would most likely raise but rather all positions that 
the IRS might take that are more than merely arguable, colorable, frivolous 
or patently improper.”136  Indeed, a practitioner “must do so even if the 
position has a low likelihood of success or the IRS is unlikely to raise the 
issue for policy or other reasons.”137  
This restriction on an attorney’s ability to separate the wheat from 
the chaff when advising a client may seriously impede the quality of the 
advice, and may greatly diminish the client’s interest in receiving it.  As 
another prominent commentator has noted, clients “do not want to read 
about all potentially significant tax issues.  They want their advisors to 
serve as a filter, to tell them where the real risks are and how they can be 
addressed.”138  Distinguishing between material concerns and theoretical or 
peripheral ones is a prerequisite to developing and dispensing sound legal 
advice.  To the extent that the “reasonable basis” standard for defining 
“significant federal tax issues” in covered opinions prevents attorneys from 
engaging in that fundamental exercise, the Covered Opinion Regulations 
may therefore substantially diminish the value of the tax counsel that clients 
receive. 
 
E. The Regulations are Far Too Broad, and they Capture Much More 
than the Tax Shelter Advice that they were Intended to Regulate 
By far the most significant criticism of the Covered Opinion 
Regulations is that they are incredibly overbroad.  The intent of the 
Covered Opinion Regulations is to impose rigorous requirements on legal 
opinions provided in connection with tax shelters, in order to prevent such 
opinions from being used to support abusive shelters.139  As written, 
however, the regulations cover far more than opinions related to tax 
shelters.  This is because the phrase “significant purpose,” as used in 
Circular 230 § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C) and (b)(10), is so broad that a Significant 
Purpose Transaction could include virtually any matter as to which a client 
                                                 
136. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2003)). 
137. Id. (citation omitted). 
138. James M. Peaslee, Attorney Seeks Improvements to Circular 230 Rules, 2005 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 45-14 (March 9, 2005) (quoted in Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 316-
17). 
139.  “[O]ne may argue that that the plain meaning of [§ 822 of the JOBS Act] clearly 
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue Circular 230 addressing written tax advice 
if [such advice] has ‘a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.’”  Vasquez & Vasquez, supra 
note 56, at 300 (quoting Pub. L. 108-357, § 822(b), 118 Stat. 1418, 1587 (2004)).  However, 
“one must look no further than the same tax act to discover that ‘Congress deliberately 
targeted its burdensome opinion standards to situations where there is a risk of shelter 
activity.’”  Id. (quoting Jeffrey H. Paravano & Melinda L. Reynolds, The ew Circular 230 
Regulations—Best Practices or Scarlet Letter?, 46 TAX MGMT. MEMO 339, 340 (2005)).  See 
also Isaac J. Roang, To Disclaim or ot to Disclaim: IRS Circular 230 Requirements for 
Written Advice, 19 GEO. LEGAL ETHICS 937, 946 (Summer 2006) (“The [Covered Opinion 
Regulations] were, presumably, initiated in response to a marketed tax shelter opinion 
problem.”).  




would ever seek tax counsel.140  Almost any undertaking in which a tax 
advisor is consulted could accurately be said to have as a significant 
purpose the avoidance of income tax, because the “very essence” of 
providing transactional tax advice is to find ways to make transactions more 
tax efficient.141  Thus, for example, items of written advice concerning such 
matters as like-kind exchanges, corporate reorganizations, and choices of 
business entity could all be construed as covered opinions under a literal 
reading of the regulations’ “significant purpose” language.142  In short, the 
“significant purpose” advice regulated under Circular 230 is not confined to 
counsel concerning aggressive, potentially abusive endeavors; instead, it 
encompasses all legitimate tax planning.143 
This flaw greatly exacerbates all of the other problems with the 
Covered Opinion Regulations.  Because the regulations apply to written 
advice concerning virtually every tax matter, the issues described above 
relate to nearly everything that any tax practitioner does.  The regulations 
do not merely impact counsel related specifically to tax shelters (as they 
were meant to); rather, they impose burdens and restrictions on the 
provision of practically all tax advice.  To fix the problems with the 
Covered Opinion Regulations, the first and most important step is therefore 
to correct their scope.  The broad reach of the “significant purpose” 
regulations must be narrowed so that they encompass only tax shelter 
advice, and nothing more (as proposed in Part V.B infra144).  Because 
                                                 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15; see also infra text accompanying notes 
206-09. 
141. See Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 297; see also Swartz & Bertrand, supra 
note 46, at 257 (“it is not clear whether structuring a transaction that would otherwise occur 
for good business reasons in a tax-efficient manner could constitute a significant tax 
avoidance purpose”); Roang, supra note 139, at 947 (Covered Opinion Regulations “go 
much farther than tax shelters because almost all tax opinions have a ‘significant purpose’ to 
avoid taxes”).  
142. See Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 297; see also Paul, supra note 66 
(providing various examples of routine tax advice that could be characterized as a having tax 
avoidance as a “significant purpose”).  
143. The IRS has made a number of statements indicating that it will not apply the 
Covered Opinion Regulations in the context of transactions that are not overly aggressive.  
Roang, supra note 139, at 947; see also Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 321-22 
(describing various IRS statements to the effect that “the literal language of § 10.35 is not 
what will control”).  These statements have been less than reassuring to the tax bar, however.  
Commentators Jeffrey H. Paravano and Melinda L. Reynolds have summed up practitioners’ 
response well: 
Statements by government officials that tax advisors should take comfort in the 
fact that the Circular 230 rules will be enforced in a “reasonable” rather than a 
literal manner are appreciated but also create a certain amount of horror in the 
minds of tax practitioners who feel compelled to attempt to comply with the laws 
as written.  If a regulation cannot or will not be enforced pursuant to its terms, the 
regulation should be changed. 
Jeffrey H. Paravano & Melinda L. Reynolds, The ew Circular 230 Regulations—Best 
Practices or Scarlet Letter?, 46 Tax Mgmt. Memo 339, 341-42 (2005) (quoted in Vasquez 
& Vasquez, supra note 56, at 322). 
144. See infra text accompanying notes 211-14. 
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providing counsel on tax shelters is a decidedly small part of what tax 
practitioners do, this one change will make any remaining problems with 
the Covered Opinion Regulations far easier to deal with.  It will remove 
those problems from the center of tax practice to the periphery. 
 
F. The Opt-Out Procedures and Related on-Reliance Disclaimers 
Also Create Certain Problems 
As mentioned before, a practitioner can opt out of compliance with 
the due diligence and drafting requirements under Circular 230 § 10.35(c) 
by prominently placing a Non-Reliance Disclaimer on his or her opinion, if 
the opinion relates to a Significant Purpose Transaction and is a “reliance 
opinion.”145  Opting out is also possible in the case of an opinion that relates 
to a Significant Purpose Transaction and is a “marketed opinion,” if the 
opinion contains both a Non-Reliance Disclaimer and certain additional 
“consumer protection” legends.146  There is no ability to opt out of 
complying with the regulations if the opinion relates to a Listed Transaction 
or a Principal Purpose Transaction, or if the opinion relates to a Significant 
Purpose Transaction and is either “subject to conditions of confidentiality” 
or “subject to contractual protection.”147  When the rules permit, opting out 
of compliance enables a practitioner to avoid the above-described problems 
that stem from the regulations’ due diligence and drafting requirements. 
The use of Non-Reliance Disclaimers has thus become extremely 
widespread in tax practice.  Indeed, nearly all law firms that provide any tax 
advice now include Non-Reliance Disclaimers on most of their written 
correspondence—including literally all of their e-mails—even when the 
correspondence has nothing to do with a tax matter.148  For example, if an 
attorney sends you an e-mail asking if you want to grab a beer after work, 
you are now usually cautioned that the invitation cannot be used as a 
defense against the imposition of tax penalties.  This absurd overuse of 
Non-Reliance Disclaimers has turned them into objects of ridicule.149  
Though the firms themselves no doubt recognize the ludicrousness of this 
approach, they nevertheless “prefer using these blanket disclosure 
procedures rather than requiring each lawyer to make a determination as to 
whether a particular written communication is subject to [Circular 230’s] 
due diligence and drafting guidelines.”150  This practice has therefore 
                                                 
145. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
147. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
148. Weiser, supra note 15, at 33; Schumacher, supra note 72, at 62-63. 
149. For a while, one internet vendor even sold t-shirts, mugs and underwear 
“emblazoned with the no-penalty-protection mantra.”  Schumacher, supra note 72, at 63 
(discussing the vendor Café Press, whose website is www.cafepress.com). 
150. Weiser, supra note 15, at 33. 




become almost universal, despite the fact that the IRS has strongly objected 
to it.151 
Although Non-Reliance Disclaimers have become commonplace as 
a way to avoid other burdens of the Covered Opinion Regulations, the 
disclaimers themselves have significant drawbacks.   They, too, have 
therefore garnered much criticism. 
First, and most obviously, a Non-Reliance Disclaimer prevents an 
opinion from being invoked as part of a reasonable-cause-and-good-faith 
defense to the imposition of accuracy-related penalties under § 6662 of the 
Code (or § 6662A(a) of the Code, in the case of disclosed reportable 
transactions) or fraud penalties under § 6663 of the Code.152  The potential 
harm this causes to the opinion’s recipient is self-evident and requires little 
elaboration.  Suffice it to say that, if a tax opinion endorses a particular 
reporting position, and it turns out that the opinion cannot be used to defend 
against the assessment of penalties arising from that reporting position, the 
opinion will have been worthless to the client (both as “insurance” and as 
advice). 
Second, because Non-Reliance Disclaimers have become 
ubiquitous, it is likely that many clients have come to view the disclaimers 
as meaningless boilerplate that they can simply ignore.153  Of course, this is 
not a problem in the many instances (like the invitation for a beer) when the 
disclaimer should be ignored.  Yet there can be a big problem if a client 
becomes “trained” to ignore Non-Reliance Disclaimers in formal legal 
opinions (or other written communications) that contain tax advice.  In such 
cases, clients will fail to recognize the substantial limitations of the advice 
                                                 
151. Id. at 33 (citing IRS statements reported in 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY116-4 (June 
17, 2005)).  
152. For a discussion of the accuracy-related penalties under § 6662, the fraud penalty 
under § 6663, and the reasonable-cause-and-good-faith defense to those penalties under 
§ 6664(c)(1), see supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the 
accuracy-related penalties under § 6662A, which apply to reportable transaction 
understatements, and the reasonable-cause-and-good-faith defense to the § 6662A(a) penalty 
that is available under § 6664(d)(1) only in the case of properly disclosed reportable 
transactions, see supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.  At least one commentator has 
argued that a Non-Reliance Disclaimer may not actually preclude assertion of the 
reasonable-cause-and-good-faith defense because Treasury has not amended the regulations 
under § 6664 to provide that opinions that include such disclaimers cannot be used as part of 
such a defense.  See Moldenhauer, supra note 97, at 858.  Such an amendment to those 
regulations would no doubt add clarity.  However, even without such a clarification, it is 
difficult to imagine a court concluding that reliance on an opinion is a reasonable cause for, 
or an act in good faith with respect to, a reporting position if the opinion itself expressly 
provides that it cannot be relied upon to avoid the imposition of penalties.  Curiously, the 
commentator also asserts that, even if an opinion “fails to meet the standards for avoiding 
penalties under Code Section 6664,” a taxpayer may be able to rely on the opinion as a 
defense against the negligence penalty under § 6662(b)(1) or the fraud penalty under § 6663.  
Id.  It is hard to see how this can be true, given that the sole statutory basis for the 
reasonable-cause-and-good-faith defense to the negligence and fraud penalties (as well as to 
the substantial-underpayment penalty under § 6662(b)(2)) derives from § 6664(c)(1). 
153. Schenk, supra note 67, at 1313; Paul, supra note 66, at 17. 
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they receive.  Legal advice that qualifies for the reasonable-cause-and-
good-faith defense against tax penalties is qualitatively different from 
advice that does not.  Clients who do not fully appreciate when they are 
getting the latter, rather than the former, can be severely disadvantaged as a 
result.154 
Third, any client who actually pays attention to the disclaimer, and 
who comprehends its significance, is apt to lose confidence in the advice 
that he or she has received—and in the practitioner who has provided it.  
One commentator has offered an interpretation of the typical Non-Reliance 
Disclaimer that is admittedly cynical, but also undeniably accurate:  “Even 
though you have requested and paid for professional tax advice, it will be 
useless to you if the IRS decides to penalize you for relying on it.”155  Not 
only will a client who adopts this interpretation be nonplussed to learn that 
the disclaimer renders the communication useless as penalty protection; he 
or she may question whether the advice contained in the communication 
can be trusted or relied upon for any purpose.156  This is yet another way in 
which the Covered Opinion Regulations may have the effect of dissuading 
some clients from seeking tax counsel in the first place. 
 
G. To Address the Problems with the on-Reliance Disclaimers, Some 
Commentators Have Recommended Switching to an Opt-In System 
in Lieu of the Opt-Out Approach 
To address these disclaimer issues—and to make it even easier to 
avoid the Circular 230 § 10.35(c) due diligence and drafting 
requirements—many commentators have proposed replacing the opt-out 
regime under the current regulations with an opt-in regime.  This 
recommendation was the hallmark of the New York State Bar Association’s 
comments on the December 2004 Amendments,157 and a great number of 
others have since echoed the suggestion.158   Under an opt-in approach, an 
                                                 
154. For one thing, if a client does not realize that a proffered communication will not 
provide penalty protection, he or she has no meaningful opportunity to purchase an 
alternative form of covered opinion that would provide such protection.  For another, such 
misunderstandings may lead some clients to try to rely on opinions with Non-Reliance 
Disclaimers to avoid imposition of penalties, despite the existence of the disclaimers.  See 
Schenk, supra note 67, at 1313 (“It seems entirely likely that a client faced with a substantial 
underpayment penalty will continue to assert that she relied on an attorney’s opinion despite 
a legend on the opinion.”).  Unfortunately, any client who does so is likely to be in for a rude 
awakening. 
155. Law, supra note 69, at 24. 
156. See id.; see also Paul, supra note 66, at 17 (“[C]lients may view the banners as 
heavy-handed, causing them to distrust [practitioners’] advice.”); Edward F. Koren, ABA 
Section Members Comments on Circular 230 Regs., 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 90-23 (May 
11, 2005) (quoted in Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 316) (“Clients will fear . . . that 
they cannot rely on the practitioner’s advice due to the existence of  the disclaimer language 
that is prominently displayed.”). 
157. See Paul, supra note 66. 
158. For but a small subset of the other opiners who have recommended an opt-in 
approach, see, e.g., Roang, supra note 139, at 949; Schizer, supra note 100, at 363; Schenk, 




opinion would not be subject to the due diligence and drafting requirements 
under the Covered Opinion Regulations, no matter what the nature of the 
transaction to which it relates, unless the opinion expressly states that it is 
intended to be relied on as a defense against the imposition of penalties 
under the Code.159  Non-Reliance Disclaimers would thus become 
unnecessary; they would be replaced by affirmative statements (on the 
relatively few opinions that meet the heightened due diligence and drafting 
guidelines) to the effect that the related opinions are intended to provide 
penalty protection.  Despite its apparent popularity among some 
practitioners and scholars, this idea should be categorically rejected.  For 
the reasons explained in Part V.C, allowing practitioners to “opt in” to 
compliance with the regulations’ due diligence and drafting requirements, is 
inimical to the purpose of preventing those practitioners from facilitating 
abusive tax shelters. 
V. FIXING WHAT IS WRONG, AND KEEPING WHAT IS RIGHT, WITH 
THE COVERED OPINION REGULATIONS 
 
A. The Basic Framework of the Regulations Should Be Retained 
In response to the problems with the Covered Opinion Regulations 
outlined in Part IV, at least one prominent legal scholar has concluded that 
the regulations should be discarded altogether.160  As noted above, a 
number of other commentators—scholars and practitioners alike—think 
that the regulations should be revised by replacing the current opt-out 
regime with an opt-in approach.161  This change, too, would essentially 
eviscerate the regulations because it would make compliance with them 
merely voluntary. 
Despite the real and serious concerns that the regulations raise, 
neither of these alternatives is acceptable, because each would leave a 
gaping hole in the rules that prohibit abusive tax shelters.  As we have seen, 
tax attorneys, and the opinions they provided, were essential to the rise of 
the market for abusive corporate tax shelters in the 1990s.162  As recent 
history also teaches us, efforts at self-regulation through rules of 
professional ethics and other aspirational best practices have been 
insufficient to reign in those tax practitioners who would deliver 
                                                                                                                 
supra note 67, at 1316-18; see also Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 313-14 (quoting 
published comments of attorneys Kenneth Horwitz, Kenneth Gideon, Arthur L. Bailey, 
Jerald August and Guy Maxfield).  
159. Paul, supra note 66, at 18; Roang, supra note 139, at 949; Vasquez & Vasquez, 
supra note 56, at 314. 
160. See generally Schenk, supra note 67. 
161. See supra Part IV.G. 
162. For a discussion of the involvement of tax attorneys in abusive corporate tax 
shelters in the 1990s, the centrality of their opinions to those enterprises, and the dubious 
techniques they used to prepare those opinions, see supra notes 76-105 and accompanying 
text. 
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incomplete, misleading or otherwise unreasonable legal opinions in order to 
facilitate abusive tax shelter transactions.163  Regrettably, this experience 
demonstrates that there is a strong need for the Covered Opinion 
Regulations, or something akin to them, to curtail the deceitful opinion 
practices of tax practitioners who otherwise would be tempted to support 
such transactions.  Regulatory efforts in this regard thus cannot simply be 
abandoned.  If the current regulations are imperfect—and they certainly 
are—then we must mend them, not end them. 
1. Effective Regulations Should Enlist the Aid of Practitioners in 
Deterring Clients from Engaging in Abusive Transactions 
 
One obvious threshold goal of any regulations in this area should 
be to prevent unscrupulous tax practitioners from delivering unsound legal 
opinions that encourage investors to participate in abusive shelters.  
However, to deter abusive tax shelters effectively, a regulatory scheme 
must not only prohibit bad behavior by tax practitioners; it must actually 
enlist the aid of private practice tax attorneys in reigning in their clients.164  
In other words, the regulations must incent tax attorneys to dissuade or 
inhibit their own clients from engaging in abusive transactions. 
This is true for at least two reasons.  First, the IRS simply does not 
have adequate resources to identify and stop all abusive tax shelter activity 
on its own.165  There is a mismatch in resources between the private tax bar 
and government tax attorneys that is reflected both in the low audit rate and, 
more generally, in the comparatively lean manner in which the government 
staffs all enforcement matters.166  Second, and even more importantly, the 
government is significantly limited in its access to information.  In our 
system of voluntary compliance, the taxpayer typically controls the flow of 
tax information to the government, generally reporting only what the IRS 
specifically requests (and usually construing those requests in the 
narrowest, most self-interested manner).167  As a result, no matter how 
                                                 
163. See, e.g., Rostain, supra note 73, at 93 (noting, in a discussion of attorneys’ role in 
the rise of the 1990s corporate tax shelter market, that “[t]he general standards for tax advice 
in the regulations did not inhibit lawyers from providing opinions for abusive transactions; 
nor had the American Bar Association enunciated stricter standards.”).  For more about the 
inadequacy of professional ethics rules to curb the delivery of unsound legal opinions that 
facilitate abusive tax shelters, see supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
164. See generally Schizer, supra note 100; see also Schumacher, supra note 72, at 
100.  
165. For a detailed discussion of the limits of the government’s tax enforcement 
resources, and the mismatch in resources between the IRS and the private tax bar, in 
particular, see Schizer, supra note 100, at 331-45; see also Schumacher, supra note 72, at 
100 (“The enforcement budget is insufficient for the government to ever fully win the tax 
shelter war.”) (citations omitted). 
166. Schizer, supra note 100, at 331. 
167. Id. at 337 (“[Taxpayers] have the further advantage of controlling the flow of 
information to the government, offering only what the government requests (and, even then, 
typically construing the government’s request in a self-interested way).”).  




many resources it throws at enforcement, the government often may not 
learn about abusive tax shelters until long after they have been completed.  
Many times, the government will not make the discovery until after a 
particular type of shelter has proliferated repeatedly throughout the market.  
It is therefore well recognized that “the IRS cannot solve the shelter 
problem without the help of the bar and tax professionals in general.”168 
Even relative to other tax professionals, such as tax accountants, tax 
attorneys are particularly well suited to the role of policing their clients’ tax 
shelter activity, because of their unique understanding of the judicially-
created legal doctrines that distinguish between abusive and legitimate 
transactions.169  Judicial constructs such as the business purpose doctrine 
and the newly-codified economic substance doctrine170 give weight and 
effect to the fundamental idea that the Code is intended to tax income, 
minus only the cost of generating such income, and that the only legitimate 
tax deductions are therefore those which arise from activity undertaken with 
an intent (and reasonable expectation) to generate income.171  As noted 
above,172 one significant contributor to the rise of the abusive corporate tax 
shelter market in the 1990s was an increased adherence to hyper-textual 
interpretations of the tax law, in which overly aggressive transactions were 
justified on the basis of literal readings of Code provisions, without giving 
any consideration to the economic substance or business purpose 
doctrines.173 
Just as ignoring those doctrines was necessary to the completion of 
the abusive deals of the 1990s, anything that restricts taxpayers to 
endeavors which have economic substance and a good business purpose 
will, by definition, curtail unduly aggressive transactions.  This is where the 
expertise of a private practice tax attorney, if properly directed, can be used 
                                                 
168. Schumacher, supra note 72, at 100. 
169. Rostain, supra note 73, at 82 (“Tax lawyers are especially suited to this 
gatekeeping role because of their expertise in the judicially created doctrines that developed 
to distinguish abusive tax shelters from legitimate tax planning.”); see also id. at 114-15 
(“Tax lawyers are appropriate gatekeepers because they enjoy in-depth knowledge of 
cases.”). 
170. On May 30, 2010, the economic substance doctrine was codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7701(o).  See supra note 99 and accompanying text.  The economic substance doctrine was 
judicially created, however, and prior to § 7710(o), it was a common-law doctrine.  See 
supra note 98.  Although § 7701(o) introduces some new factors for testing whether a 
transaction has economic substance, the economic substance doctrine under the Code is 
likely to remain essentially similar to the common law doctrine in many, if not most, 
significant respects.  See Jackel, supra note 99, at 296.  Thus, the newly-codified version of 
the doctrine continues to incorporate the complexities nuances of the common law doctrine 
that often require the knowledge and experience of a seasoned tax practitioner to unpack.   
171. See Rostain, supra note 73, at 84-86; see also supra note 98 (for further detail 
regarding the economic substance and business purpose doctrines, and the concepts 
underlying them). 
172. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
173. Rostain, supra note 73, at 82, 114.  The economic substance was originally a 
common law doctrine, but (as noted above) was very recently added to the Code.  For a 
discussion of the doctrine’s codification, see generally Jackel, supra note 99.  
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effectively to stem the tide of abusive shelters.  To accomplish this, tax 
shelter regulations must create strong incentives for a client to seek the 
attorney’s “blessing” upon a tax shelter transaction, and they must create 
equally strong incentives for the attorney to condition his or her blessing on 
a reasoned determination that the transaction has both pre-tax economic 
substance and a legitimate non-tax business purpose.174 
2. Thus Far, the Covered Opinion Regulations Have Effectively 
Created a Role for Tax Practitioners as “Gatekeepers” to Block 
Abusive Transactions 
 
Up until now, the Covered Opinion Regulations have fostered 
exactly the kind of incentives described above.  To create those incentives 
on the clients’ side, the Covered Opinion Regulations tie to the Code 
provisions and Treasury regulations concerning penalties and defenses 
against penalties.  The prospect of an addition to tax in the amount of 20% 
of any substantial underpayment175 (or 20% of any reportable transaction 
understatement, in the case of a properly disclosed reportable transaction176) 
is a significant risk to be considered in the context of any aggressive 
transaction, and any taxpayer contemplating a tax shelter will be strongly 
incented to avoid such a penalty.  Happily, the Code allows for a 
reasonable-cause-and-good faith defense against the imposition of such 
those penalties.177  In turn, a related Treasury regulation expressly provides 
that—in the case of a penalty that would arise out of a corporate tax 
shelter—the minimum requirements for such a defense under the Code may 
be met by good-faith reliance on the opinion of a professional tax 
advisor.178  Thus, a client who proposes to engage in a tax shelter has a 
strong incentive to obtain a legal opinion that meets those requirements. 
                                                 
174. See Rostain, supra note 73, at 105-06.  In order for such regulations to succeed, it 
is critical that the interests of attorney and taxpayer be aligned properly.  Appeals to an 
attorney’s professional norms or his or her duty to the system may have limited effect, but 
any regulatory scheme that places the lawyer’s interests at odds with the client’s, is 
ultimately doomed to failure.  See Schizer, supra note 100, at 355-71 (discussing the need to 
align the interests of attorneys and clients by giving attorneys incentives and opportunities to 
police clients’ involvement in aggressive and potentially abusive transactions).  
175. See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2) (2010). 
176. See I.R.C. § 6662A(a) (2010). 
177. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2010) (providing for a reasonable-cause-and-good-faith 
exception to the § 6662 and § 6663 penalties); see also I.R.C. § 6664(d) (2010) (providing 
for a more stringent reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exception to the § 6662A(a) penalty in 
the case of properly disclosed reportable transactions, but expressly denying the availability 
of such exception to the 30% penalty under § 6662A(c) applicable in the case of undisclosed 
reportable transactions). 
178. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f) (2010).  For further discussion of the Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6664-4(f) minimum requirements, see supra note 89.  The requirements under the 
section 1.6664-4 regulations for opinions upon which taxpayers may rely in order to invoke 
the exception to the § 6662 and § 6663 penalties “are very similar, but not identical, to” the 
Covered Opinion Regulations.  Schenk, supra note 67, at 1313.  Additional standards as to 
opinions that may not be relied on to invoke the exception to the § 6662A(a) penalty (with 




On the attorneys’ side, the Circular 230 § 10.35(c) due diligence 
and drafting standards are all directed at requiring a practitioner to 
conclude—on the basis of a substantial factual and legal inquiry—that a tax 
shelter transaction has economic substance and a legitimate business 
purpose, before he or she delivers an opinion that can be relied upon for 
penalty protection.  In preparing the opinion, the practitioner cannot rely on 
unreasonable factual assumptions or representations.179  In particular, he or 
she cannot rely on any blanket assumption or representation that the deal in 
question has economic substance or a valid business purpose.180  In relating 
the facts to relevant law, the practitioner is expressly required to consider 
all “potentially applicable judicial doctrines” (a requirement that is targeted 
particularly to consideration of the economic substance and business 
purpose doctrines).181  In so doing, the practitioner must address all 
significant federal tax issues related to the transaction.182  This prevents him 
or her from simply glossing over inconvenient obstacles (like economic 
substance or business purpose considerations) in a “partial” opinion of the 
sort that was often used in the abusive shelters of the 1990s.183  Finally, to 
be eligible for use as penalty protection, the opinion must reach a 
conclusion at a confidence level of at least more-likely-than-not that the 
taxpayer will prevail on the merits with respect to each such significant 
federal tax issue.184  If the opinion does not meet these basic requirements, 
it must contain a Non-Reliance Disclaimer, which will preclude the opinion 
from being usable as a defense against penalties.  The sanctions against 
                                                                                                                 
respect to disclosed reportable transactions) are set forth in § 6664(d).  See I.R.C. 
§ 6664(d)(4)(B) (2010). 
179. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(ii) and (iii).  For further discussion of these 
requirements, see supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text. 
180. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(ii) and (iii). 
181. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(2)(i).  For further discussion of these requirements, see supra 
notes 24-29 and accompanying text.  At the time when the Covered Opinion Regulations 
were adopted, the economic substance doctrine was strictly a common law doctrine.  The 
doctrine was just codified, at § 7701(o), on March 30, 2010.  See supra note 99 and 
accompanying text.  Within certain limitations, a practitioner may rely on the opinion of 
another practitioner with regard to some significant federal tax issues.  See 31 C.F.R. 
§ 10.35(d)(1).  Limited Scope Opinions are permissible in some cases.  See 31 C.F.R. 
§ 10.35(c)(3)(v)(A).  However, a Limited Scope Opinion must include a legend expressly 
indicating that it cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties related to significant 
federal tax issues that are not specifically addressed in the opinion.  See 31 C.F.R. 
§ 10.35(e)(3)(iii).  For further discussion of a practitioner’s ability to rely on others’ opinions 
and further discussion of Limited Scope Opinions, see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying 
text. 
182. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(i).  For a description of what constitutes a “significant 
Federal tax issue” under Circular 230, see supra note 8. 
183. For a discussion of “partial opinions” and their use in the abusive corporate tax 
shelters of the 1990s, see supra text accompanying notes 104-05. 
184. If an opinion fails to reach such a conclusion at such a confidence level with 
respect to any significant federal tax issue, the opinion must prominently disclose that fact 
and must prominently state that the taxpayer cannot use the opinion to avoid the imposition 
of penalties arising from such issue.  31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(c)(4) and 10.35(e)(4).  See supra 
note 35 and accompanying text. 
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practitioners who violate the regulations are considerable,185 and the 
incentives to meet these due diligence and drafting standards are therefore 
strong. 
Thus, up until now, the Covered Opinion Regulations have done 
something even more valuable than to prevent practitioners from delivering 
unreasonable legal opinions.  The regulations have established the attorney 
as a “gatekeeper” through whom a client must pass in order to complete a 
tax shelter transaction.186  The client desires a defense against penalties that 
the transaction might provoke and, at least up to this point, he or she could 
generally invoke such a defense through reliance on a covered opinion.  In 
order to deliver the opinion that the client needs and wants, the attorney has 
to determine, inter alia, that the transaction has economic substance and a 
valid business purpose.  In this way, the regulations cause attorneys to 
prevent (or, at least, impede) their clients from participating in abusive 
shelters.  This, of course, is precisely what the regulations should do.   
3. New Strict Liability Penalty for Transactions Without Economic 
Substance May Undermine the Covered Opinion Regulations’ 
Effectiveness at Creating a “Gatekeeper” Role for Tax 
Practitioners, but the Regulations Should Still Remain in Force 
 
In conjunction with the recent codification of the economic 
substance doctrine under § 7701(o) of the Code,187 Congress also added 
§ 6662(b)(6) of the Code, which provides for a new accuracy-related 
penalty in the case of transactions lacking economic substance.188  At the 
same time, Congress amended § 6664(c) of the Code to specify that there is 
                                                 
185. For a description of those sanctions, see supra text accompanying notes 41-48. 
186. See Rostain, supra note 73, at 82 (discussing the efficacy of using attorneys as 
“gatekeepers” by drawing on their expertise in interpreting and applying the economic 
substance and business purpose doctrines “to distinguish abusive tax shelters from legitimate 
tax planning”); see also Schizer, supra note 100, at 363 (noting, with approval, the 
government’s efforts, through Circular 230, rely on the tax bar “to monitor clients, and to 
give opinions (and thus the potential for penalty protection) only when they are deserved”); 
Schumacher, supra note 72, at 101 (“tax advisors must recognize their central role as 
gatekeepers and their duty to the system”). 
187. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
188. Section 6662(b)(6) was added to the Code (together with § 7701(o)) as part of the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, and became effective as of March 
30, 2010.  Section 6662(b)(6) provides that the 6662(a) addition to tax, which is an amount 
equal to 20 percent of certain underpayments of tax, applies to underpayments of tax 
attributable to “[a]ny disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking 
economic substance (within the meaning of section 7701(o)) or failing to meet the 
requirements of any similar rule of law.”  I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2010).  Under newly-enacted 
§ 6662(i), another related addition to the Code, the addition to tax for underpayments 
attributable to non-economic substance transactions jumps from “20 percent” to “40 
percent” of the underpayment, in the case of any transaction described in § 6662(b)(6) “with 
respect to which the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment are not adequately disclosed in 
the return nor in a statement attached to the return.”  I.R.C. § 6662(i)(1) and (i)(2) (2010).  
See Jackel, supra note 99, at 294 (discussing §§ 6662(b)(6) and 6662(i)). 




no reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exception to the § 6662(b)(6) 
penalty.189  Accordingly, a taxpayer cannot rely on any legal opinion—even 
one that meets all of the Circular 230 § 10.35(c) due diligence and drafting 
requirements—as a defense against imposition of the new penalty for 
transactions that do not have economic substance. 
Given that one hallmark of an abusive tax shelter is its lack of 
economic substance, the new § 6662(b)(6) penalty has the potential to apply 
to virtually all abusive shelter transactions going forward.190  Because 
§ 6662(a) of the Code provides for the imposition of a single addition to tax 
for underpayments, only one § 6662(b) penalty may be imposed on a 
particular underpayment, “even if the underpayment is attributable to more 
than one kind of misconduct.”191  Therefore, since the § 6662(b) penalties 
do not “stack,” in future tax shelter cases the IRS will have to choose 
between assertion of the § 6662(b)(6) penalty, on one hand, and assertion of 
either the § 6662(b)(2) substantial underpayment penalty or the 
§ 6662(b)(1) negligence-or-disregard-of-rules penalty, on the other.  (In the 
case of tax shelters that are reportable transactions, the § 6662A reportable 
transaction underpayment penalties are also potentially applicable.192)  In 
view of the fact that the § 6662(b)(6) penalty is a strict liability penalty (as 
well as the fact that the amount of the penalty may be increased to 40% of 
                                                 
189. A new § 6664(c)(2) was added to the Code, also as part of the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, effective as of March 30, 2010.  Section 6664(c)(2) 
now states that § 6664(c)(1) (which provides for the reasonable-cause-and-good-faith 
exception to § 6662 and § 6663 penalties, generally) “shall not apply to any portion of an 
underpayment which is attributable to one or more transactions described in section 
6662(b)(6).”  I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2) (2010).  See Jackel, supra note 99, at 294 (discussing 
§ 6664(c)(2)).  
190. Widespread application of the § 7701(o) economic substance doctrine to tax 
shelters is plainly to be expected, given that “[t]he common-law economic substance 
doctrine mostly addresses tax-shelter-type cases.”  Jeremiah Coder & Amy S. Elliot, Some 
Economic Substance Guidance Likely, Officials Say, 127 TAX NOTES 748, 749 (May 17, 
2010) (quoting PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP managing director Monte Jackel).  Because the 
§ 6662(b)(6) penalty could be applied in the case of any violation of § 7701(o), that penalty 
is therefore at least potentially applicable in all future tax shelter cases. 
191. Leandra Lederman & Stephen W. Mazza, TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 480 (3rd ed. 2009). 
192. Pursuant to § 6662A(e) of the Code, both the § 6662A reportable understatement 
penalty and one of the § 6662(b) substantial underpayment penalties may apply in the same 
transaction (if the transaction is a reportable transaction).  See I.R.C. § 6662A(e)(1)(B) 
(2010) (providing that a penalty under § 6662(a) may be applied to the excess of a § 6662(b) 
substantial understatement over the portion of such understatement that constitutes a 
reportable transaction understatement to which a § 6662A penalty has been applied).  Even 
in the case of a reportable transaction understatement, however, the IRS has the discretion to 
apply one of the § 6662(b) penalties (including, of course, the new § 6662(b)(6) penalty), 
rather than a § 6662A penalty, to the entire understatement.  See I.R.C. § 6662(b) (flush 
language effectively requires choice, with respect to any portion of any underpayment, of 
only one of a § 6662 penalty, the § 6663 penalty or a § 6662A penalty).  Moreover, there is 
no reasonable cause exception to the imposition of a § 6662A(a) penalty in the case of any 
portion of a reportable transaction understatement that arises from a transaction to which a 
§ 6662(b)(6) penalty applies because the transaction lacks economic substance.  See I.R.C. 
§ 6664(d)(2). 
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the related underpayment, in some cases193), the IRS would appear to have 
strong incentives to choose that penalty whenever possible. 
To the extent that the § 6662(b)(6) penalty supplants other 
accuracy-related penalties with respect to tax shelters, the effectiveness of 
the Covered Opinion Regulations in creating a “gatekeeper” role for tax 
practitioners threatens to be severely undermined.  If a covered opinion no 
longer provides insurance against the most probable accuracy-related 
penalty to be imposed on a tax shelter, clients will be likely no longer to 
view the receipt of such an opinion as a prerequisite to entering into an 
aggressive transaction. (This is particularly true in light of the high 
transaction costs that the regulations impose on such opinions).  In turn, if a 
client no longer views a covered opinion as a necessity when investing in a 
tax shelter, then a practitioner’s withholding of such an opinion will no 
longer function as a strong impediment to the client’s participation in an 
abusive deal.  Much of the Covered Opinion Regulations’ deterrent effect 
on taxpayer behavior will thus be lost. 
This threatened diminution of the Covered Opinion Regulations’ 
effectiveness at reigning in taxpayers is plainly regrettable.  However, that 
is not an excuse to call for the regulations to be repealed.   
First, it is too early to know exactly how—and to what extent—the 
§ 6662(b)(6) penalty will be applied in future tax shelter cases.  In response 
to early concerns raised by tax practitioners, Treasury officials have 
acknowledged that there are “risks inherent in the strict liability penalty 
imposed by” § 6662(b)(6),194 and that the lack of any reasonable cause 
defense to the penalty “raises issues for both taxpayers and the IRS.”195  
                                                 
193. See I.R.C. § 6662(i) (2010) (providing that the addition to tax under § 6662(b)(6) 
increases from 20 percent to 40 percent of the underpayment, in the case of any 
“Nonreported Noneconomic Substance Transaction”).  In contrast, § 6662A(c) provides only 
a 30 percent for undisclosed reportable transaction understatements.  Thus, even in the 
context of unreported transactions, the IRS has incentive to choose the § 6662(b)(6) penalty.  
194. Crystal Tandon, Treasury Planning Guidance on Economic Substance Penalties, 
127 TAX NOTES 965 (May 31, 2010) (recounting remarks of Bob Crnkovich, senior tax 
counsel (partnerships) in Treasury’s Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, during a May 2010 
Practicing Law Institute seminar in New York concerning the codified economic substance 
doctrine). 
195. Jeremiah Coder, Guidance on Economic Substance to Address Uncertainty, 127 
TAX NOTES 737 (May 17, 2010) (describing statements made by Byron Christensen, 
Treasury deputy tax legislative counsel, during a May 2010 District of Columbia Taxation 
Section luncheon program).  The primary risk, and chief concern raised by practitioners, is 
of course that the imposition of strict liability under § 6664(c) will result in the application 
of the § 6662(b)(6) penalty even in cases where taxpayers have attempted in good faith to 
follow the complex (and sometimes ambiguous) rules of the newly-codified economic 
substance doctrine.  Attorney Bryan C. Skarlatos summarized the apprehensions of many tax 
advisors during a tax controversy forum sponsored by New York University that he co-
chaired in June 2010.  Skarlatos “called the codified doctrine amorphous and said the strict 
liability penalty is a ‘hammer’ waiting to drop on taxpayers despite their best efforts to 
follow technical tax rules.”  Jeremiah Coder, Economic Substance Guidance Will Have 
Limited Scope, 127 TAX NOTES 1423, 1424 (June 28, 2010).  Another issue raised by the 
introduction of the § 6662(b)(6) penalty is the new uncertainty as to which penalty the IRS 




Treasury has indicated that the IRS will therefore establish “clear, uniform 
procedures on how” the § 6662(b)(6) penalty will be applied.196  Whether 
any such procedures will ultimately be set forth in Treasury regulations or 
formal IRS guidance pronouncements is as yet unclear.197  Predictably, 
because § 6664(c) clearly and unambiguously provides that there is no 
reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exception to the § 6662(b)(6) penalty, 
Treasury’s Office of Tax Legislative Counsel has emphasized that “it would 
be inconsistent for Treasury to issue guidance providing for a reasonable 
cause defense.”198 
At the same time, however, Treasury has repeatedly assured 
practitioners that the IRS will apply § 6662(b)(6) only in “appropriate 
                                                                                                                 
will apply in a given economic substance case.  As Treasury deputy counsel Christensen has 
observed, “[a] ‘buffet of penalties’ might attach to a transaction falling under § 7701(o), so it 
is understandable that tax professionals will want to know what the penalty will be.”  Coder, 
127 TAX NOTES at 737. 
196. Tandon, supra note 194, at 965.  During a May 2010 Practicing Law Institute 
seminar in New York concerning the codified economic substance doctrine, Bob Crnkovich, 
senior tax counsel (partnerships) in Treasury’s Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, stated that 
“[w]e clearly understand the novel nature of this strict liability penalty, and we are sensitive 
to it and we are considering what procedures will be put in place.”  Id. 
197. Initial indications were that a formal elucidation of such procedures could be 
expected, but more recent pronouncements make the possibility of such guidance appear 
more doubtful.  Soon after § 7701(o) and § 6662(b)(6) were enacted, Treasury officials 
indicated that there would be forthcoming guidance as to when the § 6662(b)(6) penalty, on 
one hand, or another of the potentially applicable substantial underpayment penalties, on the 
other, will be applied to transactions that run afoul of § 7701(o).  For example, during a May 
2010 District of Columbia Taxation Section luncheon program, Byron Christensen, Treasury 
deputy tax legislative counsel, told practitioners that application of the § 6662(b)(6) strict 
liability penalty will be addressed in future guidance.  Coder, supra note 195, 127 TAX 
NOTES at 737.  Similarly, in a May 2010 Practicing Law Institute seminar in New York 
concerning the codified economic substance doctrine, Bob Crnkovich, senior tax counsel 
(partnerships) in Treasury’s Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, said that “[p]ractitioners can 
expect economic substance guidance . . . for applying the steep penalties attached to 
transactions tripped up by” § 7701(o).  Tandon, supra note 194, at 965.  More recently, 
however, Treasury has indicated that only very limited guidance will be issued with respect 
to the codified economic substance doctrine, and that there may be no formal guidance 
regarding application of the strict liability penalty.  See Coder, supra note 195, 127 TAX 
NOTES at 1423-24 (recounting comments by Treasury deputy counsel Christensen during a 
June 2010 tax controversy forum sponsored by New York University).  On September 13, 
2010, the IRS issued its first interim guidance concerning the codified economic substance 
doctrine and the related penalties.  See Notice 2010-62; 2010-40 IRB 1 (“Interim Guidance 
under the Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine and Related Provisions in the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010”).  Consistent with that more recent 
indication, Notice 2010-62 “makes no mention of whether and how the IRS would 
implement a uniform penalty procedure for assertions of the harsh strict liability penalty.”  
Amy S. Elliot, Practitioners Blast Economic Substance Guidance, 128 TAX NOTES 1212 
(Sept. 20, 2010).  Despite their disappointment with the notice, however, there are 
practitioners who remain hopeful that the IRS may provide further guidance that is more 
instructive.  See id. at 1212 -13 (quoting attorneys Cary D. Pugh and Mark Silverman).     
198. Coder, supra note 195, 127 TAX NOTES at 737 (quoting Byron Christensen, 
Treasury deputy tax legislative counsel). 
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cases.”199  Of course, Treasury and the IRS are obviously likely to conclude 
that the most abusive tax shelters are foremost among such “appropriate 
cases.”  Nevertheless, to the extent that Treasury and the IRS adopt 
procedures that place limits on the application of the § 6662(b)(6) penalty 
in § 7701(o) cases, there could remain a real possibility that, for any given 
tax shelter, an accuracy-related penalty other than the § 6662(b)(6) penalty 
might be imposed.  In that case, clients may continue to view the receipt of 
a covered opinion (which will still provide a defense against those other 
penalties) as a prerequisite to engaging in an aggressive deal.  The 
“gatekeeper” function of the Covered Opinion Regulations would then 
remain largely intact. 
Second, even if their ability to deter wrongful taxpayer behavior 
becomes compromised, the Covered Opinion Regulations will still remain 
necessary to deter bad practitioner behavior.   Even if it turns out that legal 
opinions will no longer provide penalty protection in tax shelter cases, 
taxpayers (particularly corporate taxpayers) will still typically seek legal 
advice before entering into an aggressive transaction.  Indeed, some 
commentators have argued that a strict liability penalty regime would 
increase the demand by corporate taxpayers for well-reasoned (and more 
conservative) advice from tax practitioners before investing in a tax shelter 
because, under such a regime, such taxpayers would focus more on the 
substance of the advice being given than simply whether a practitioner is 
willing to deliver any opinion that could be invoked as a penalty defense.200  
                                                 
199. During a June 2010 tax controversy forum sponsored by New York University, 
Treasury deputy tax legislative counsel Byron Christensen “said the new section 6662(b)(6) 
penalty is unique because it lacks a reasonable cause defense, but he assured the audience 
that the penalty will be asserted only in appropriate cases.  The government is interested in 
ensuring a proper level of oversight and a clear process for applying the penalty, he said.  
‘The facts and circumstances must justify assertion of the economic substance doctrine and 
penalty,’ he added.”  Coder, supra note 195, 127 TAX NOTES at 1424.  Previously, during a 
May 2010 District of Columbia Taxation Section luncheon program, Christensen proclaimed 
that “government and taxpayer interests are best served by ensuring that economic substance 
penalties are asserted only in appropriate cases.”  Coder, supra note 195, 127 TAX NOTES at 
737.  On September 14, 2010, the Large and Midsize Business Division of the IRS issued an 
internal examination guidance directive, which states that, “[t]o ensure consistent 
administration of the accuracy-related penalty imposed under section 6662(b)(6), any 
proposal to impose a section 6662(b)(6) penalty at the examination level must be reviewed 
and approved by the appropriate Director of Field Operations before the penalty is 
proposed.”  See LMSB-04-0910-024 (reprinted at 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 178-47 (Sept. 
14, 2010)).  Presumably, this directive reflects some effort by the IRS to impose the 
§ 6662(b)(6) penalty only in such “appropriate” cases (whichever those may be).    
200. See Rostain, supra note 73, at 106-07.  For example, the Tax Section of the New 
York State Bar Association has advocated for a strict liability penalty regime, contending 
that, in the tax shelter context, “the tax ‘dialogue’ between lawyer and client ha[s] become 
distorted, focusing on whether a lawyer would render an opinion rather than on the 
underlying merits of the transaction.”  Id. at 107 (citing N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, 
REPORT ON CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS OF NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION TAX 
SECTION, at 893 (1999)).  The theory underlying this argument is that “[s]trict liability 
neutralizes the protective effects of legal opinions, thereby putting the burden of avoiding 
abusive shelters squarely on taxpayers, who will be induced to seek out legal advice that is 
knowledgeable and conservative.”  Id. at 106.      




Such commentators believe that, “[s]ince clients would be unable to 
purchase penalty protection, they would seek the best legal advice, which 
lawyers would be motivated to provide.”201 
However, while taxpayers might have greater incentive to seek “the 
best legal advice” before entering into a potentially abusive transaction 
under a strict liability regime, whether tax practitioners really would always 
be motivated to deliver such advice is regrettably less certain.  In particular, 
the pro-strict-liability argument fails to consider adequately the incentives 
of practitioners who represent tax shelter promoters or whose financial 
interests are tied to the promotion of tax shelters—such as practitioners who 
deliver marketed opinions, opinions that are subject to conditions of 
confidentiality, or opinions that are subject to contractual protection.  If past 
is prologue, such practitioners would still be tempted to deliver the kinds of 
unsound legal opinions that were prevalent in the abusive corporate tax 
shelters of the 1990s202 in order to lend such transactions an “imprimatur of 
legitimacy.”203  Even if they would no longer provide a defense against 
penalties imposed on abusive shelters, such legal opinions could still 
mislead investors into believing that those deals are legitimate.204  To 
protect against a possible resurgence of such opinion practices, the Covered 
Opinion Regulations would thus remain necessary even under a strict 
liability penalty regime.  
Accordingly, the basic framework of the Covered Opinion 
Regulations should remain intact, and any calls to “throw them out and start 
over”205 should be rejected.  Of course, to say that the primary structure of 
the Covered Opinion Regulations should be retained, is obviously not to say 
that the problems with the regulations should not be addressed. 
 
                                                 
201. Id. at 107. On this view, such motivation on the part of the lawyers would result 
from a strict liability regime’s creation of “a market for well-reasoned legal advice that 
address[es] the legal merits of a transaction.”  Id.  Moreover, under this theory, the lawyers’ 
motivation would be bolstered by the fact that, because a strict liability regime motivates a 
taxpayer “to consult a tax advisor to obtain substantive legal guidance”, then “[i]f the 
lawyer’s advice turns out to be wrong on the merits, a taxpayer will have a greater likelihood 
of success in a subsequent malpractice action” than would be the case if the taxpayer had 
“obtained the lawyer’s opinion for penalty protection only.”  Id. at 107-08.  
202. For a discussion of the unsound opinions that were used in the abusive corporate 
tax shelters of the 1990s, such as partial opinions, opinions adopting a hyper-textual 
approach to statutory construction, and opinions based on unreasonable or unsupported 
factual representations or assumptions, see supra text accompanying notes 97-105. 
203. Rostain, supra note 73, at 82. 
204. See WATSON & BILLMAN, supra note 74, at 137-38 (describing how tax shelter 
investors focus on the conclusion of a legal opinion that the tax benefits are allowable, and 
typically assume that the opinion-giver has considered all pertinent issues and that any 
assumptions or qualifications in the opinion are legitimate). 
205. See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 67. 
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B. “Significant Purpose” Should Be Defined So That The Regulations 
Plainly Cover Only Tax Shelter Advice, and Do ot Apply to any 
Other Tax Advice 
First and foremost, the scope of the Covered Opinion Regulations 
should be narrowed so that the regulations apply only to opinions related 
specifically to tax shelters.  The chief problem with the Covered Opinion 
Regulations is that they apply not only to tax shelter opinions, but also to 
advice concerning virtually all other tax matters.  The onerous due diligence 
and drafting requirements of Circular 230 § 10.35(c) are necessary to curb 
abusive shelters.  As they currently stand, however, those requirements also 
place unreasonable and unwarranted burdens on the provision of tax advice 
in connection with practically all legitimate, non-shelter-related tax 
planning.206  As discussed above, this is because “covered opinions” under 
the regulations include “reliance opinions” that relate to Significant Purpose 
Transactions, and the “significant purpose” concept is so broad that it 
encompasses nearly every tax question that any tax practitioner might ever 
handle.207  Therefore, the first order of business in fixing the Covered 
Opinion Regulations is to narrow the scope of what constitutes a Significant 
Purpose Transaction. 
There is little debate that the “significant purpose” prong of the 
“covered opinion” definition goes much further than the tax shelter activity 
that the Covered Opinion Regulations were intended to regulate.  Indeed, 
even the IRS itself has acknowledged that the current “significant purpose” 
phrasing is too broad.208  At the same time, the IRS has thus far been 
reluctant to address the problem.209  Presumably, this reluctance is borne 
out of concern that any attempt to reduce the ambit of the “significant 
purpose” rules may prevent the regulations from reaching potentially 
abusive activities that somehow escape the Listed Transaction and Principal 
Purpose Transaction categories. 
A call simply to delete the “significant purpose” category, though 
tempting, is almost certainly a non-starter, because it ignores that legitimate 
concern.  Similarly, making “significant purpose” transactions synonymous 
with “reportable transactions” under § 6707A of the Code, though elegant 
in its simplicity, would not work because the universe of reportable 
transactions is narrower than the universe of all tax shelters.210  The 
                                                 
206. For further discussion of those burdens, see supra Part IV.A-F. 
207. See supra Part IV.E and text accompanying notes 14-15. 
208. Swartz & Bertrand, supra note 46, at 257 n.240 (“An IRS official recently 
acknowledged that the ‘significant purpose’ definition is ‘too broad.’”) (quoting amorato 
Says Service’s Study Group to Consider Changing Circular 230 Rules, DAILY TAX REPORT, 
March 6, 2006, at G-9). 
209. In fact, “the IRS is on record as stating not to ‘expect to see a definition of 
significant purpose.’”  Vasquez & Vasquez, supra note 56, at 297 (quoting Sheryl Stratton, 
ABA Tax Section Meeting: Tax Officials Spar with Tax Bar over Circular 230, 107 TAX 
NOTES 1082, 1083 (2005)). 
210. A tax shelter that is not a listed transaction, a confidential transaction, a transaction 
with contractual protections or a so-called transaction of interest, is not a reportable 




challenge, then, is this:  How do we narrow the concept of what constitutes 
a “significant purpose” for purposes of a covered opinion, so that the 
regulations cease to impose on non-shelter-related advice, but so that they 
also continue to apply to all potentially abusive transactions? 
Once again, the heart of the answer lies with the business purpose 
and economic substance doctrines, and with the fundamental precept that 
informs those doctrines.  As noted above, the basic premise underlying the 
business purpose and economic substance doctrines is that the Code is 
intended to tax income, minus the cost of producing such income.211  The 
corollary to that foundational rule, which is reflected in the two doctrines, is 
that the only legitimate tax deductions are those that arise from activity that 
was intended to—and that could reasonably have been expected to—
produce pre-tax economic profit.212  Framing the matter in this way 
provides a clear basis for distinguishing between legitimate tax planning 
and abusive tax shelters:  A transaction is legitimate if any deductions that 
it creates can be expected to offset income that the transaction itself 
produces.  In contrast, a transaction is an abusive shelter if it is intended to 
manufacture deductions in order to offset income that derives from other 
sources.  The key is to introduce “significant purpose” language that 
identifies the latter type of transaction and differentiates it from the former. 
I submit that this task could be accomplished through a relatively 
straightforward drafting revision to Circular 230’s “covered opinion” 
definition.  Specifically, the current language of the “significant purpose” 
prong of that definition (in Circular 230 § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)) should be 
deleted in its entirety and replaced by the following definitional phrase: 
“any partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or 
any other plan or arrangement, a significant purpose of which is the 
creation, production or generation of losses or credits in order to reduce, 
or against which to offset, income from sources other than such 
partnership, entity, plan or arrangement.”  This phrase captures any 
endeavor that should be deemed abusive, based on the criteria outlined 
above, but it does not encompass any legitimate tax planning activity.  I 
therefore propose that this italicized language be substituted for the current 
text of Circular 230 § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C).  In conjunction with this change, 
                                                                                                                 
transaction if it does not generate losses above a certain multi-million-dollar threshold.  See 
IRS Instructions for Form 8886 (Rev. Mar. 2010) (Reportable Transaction Disclosure 
Statement) at 1-3.  The Covered Opinion Regulations should apply in the context of all tax 
shelter transactions, including those which fall below that high loss threshold.  The Code 
recognizes that there are tax shelters which are not reportable transactions, and Code 
provisions distinguish between the two categories.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6694(a)(2)(C) (2010) 
(entitled “Tax Shelters and Reportable Transactions”) (emphasis supplied).  For further 
discussion of what constitutes a “reportable transaction,” see supra note 93. 
211. For a description of the economic substance and business purpose doctrines, and 
the concepts underlying them, see supra note 98.  See also supra note 99 (for a discussion of 
the economic substance doctrine as recently incorporated in the Code). 
212. See Rostain, supra note 73, at 84-86.  For further discussion of these concepts 
underlying the anti-abuse doctrines, see supra notes 98-99, 170-71 and accompanying text. 
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written advice that is subject to conditions of confidentiality or subject to 
contractual protection213 should be added as a separate category of “covered 
opinions” under Circular 230 § 10.35(b)(2)(i).  Opinions with those 
characteristics simply do not arise in any context other than tax shelters. 
Making these revisions would appropriately narrow the scope of 
the Covered Opinion Regulations to written advice specifically relating to 
potentially abusive tax shelters.214  This, in turn, would go a long way 
toward fixing everything else that is wrong with the regulations.  Once the 
regulations’ ambit is appropriately confined to shelter activity, the 
challenges that the regulations impose with respect to such things as cost 
burdens, restrictions on informal advice, and the inability to distinguish 
between significant and insignificant tax issues, would no longer affect 
anything other than a (very) small subset of tax practice.  A practitioner 
counseling on the next “son of BOSS” transaction would still have to 
wrestle with such concerns, but practitioners providing choice-of-entity, 
corporate reorganization, estate planning, or any other legitimate tax-
efficient-structuring advice would not.  If the requirements imposed by the 
regulations were imposed only on the delivery of tax shelter opinions, they 
would no longer be unduly onerous burdens on the provision of routine tax 
counsel; they would simply be necessary and reasonable restrictions on the 
historically over-aggressive practices of many tax advisors on potentially 
abusive transactions.215 
 
C. Calls to Adopt an Opt-In Approach Should Be Rejected 
Once the Covered Opinion Regulations are appropriately limited to 
advice about tax shelters, it would be particularly nonsensical to condition 
the applicability of the regulations upon a practitioner’s choice to “opt in” 
to compliance with them.  Simply put, a regulatory scheme is worthless if it 
depends on the voluntary consent of those whose activity is to be regulated.  
In such a scheme, any practitioner who wished to deliver a "partial" opinion 
that does not address all pertinent legal issues, an opinion based on 
unreasonable or unsupported factual assumptions or representations, or any 
of the other variations of unsound, misleading tax shelter opinions that have 
been used in the past to support abusive shelters, could do so with 
impunity.  Of course, under an opt-in approach, a recipient of such an 
opinion would not be able to rely on the opinion as defense against 
penalties.   The recipient may not realize this, however, because there 
                                                 
213. For a discussion of what it means under Circular 230 for an opinion to be subject 
to conditions of confidentiality or to contractual protection, see supra notes 10-11. 
214. In addition to the strong policy reasons for confining the Covered Opinion 
Regulations to tax shelter opinions, such a narrowing would bring the regulations more 
plainly within the limits of the Congressional grant of authority to the Secretary (under § 822 
of the JOBS Act) to promulgate the regulations.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text.    
215. For an analysis weighing the burdens and benefits of the regulations when applied 
to tax shelter opinions (and concluding that the former outweigh the latter, thus justifying 
repeal of the opt-out rules in such cases), see infra text accompanying notes 242-53. 




would be no disclaimer on the opinion to warn investors of its uselessness 
as penalty protection.  Nor would the recipient otherwise be likely to 
recognize that the advice in the opinion was fundamentally defective, since 
the opinion would conclude (subject to arcane qualifications that many 
readers would simply ignore216) that the tax deductions or credits created by 
the shelter in question were legitimate and permissible.  As a result, an opt-
in regime would make it easier for unscrupulous tax shelter promoters to 
use such opinions to lend abusive transactions a superficial “imprimatur of 
legitimacy.”217  For this reason, an opt-in regime is particularly ill-suited to 
the regulation of marketed opinions that are used to support abusive 
shelters.218   
Moreover, if the new strict liability penalty under § 6662(b)(6) of 
the Code becomes the accuracy-related penalty asserted in all or most tax 
shelter cases,219 adopting an opt-in approach would be tantamount to 
repealing the Covered Opinion Regulations altogether.  Under a strict 
liability regime, the opt-in approach would render the regulations entirely 
unenforceable because there never would be any reason for a practitioner to 
“opt in” to compliance with them.  The opt-in approach would require a 
practitioner to comply with the regulations only when he or she intends an 
opinion to provide penalty protection.  Obviously, few (if any) practitioners 
would volunteer to comply when drafting a tax shelter opinion, if he or she 
could avoid doing so and if the opinion would never be usable as part of a 
reasonable cause defense against imposition of the § 6662(b)(6) strict 
liability penalty in any event.  Since there would be no perceived downside 
to refraining from opting in when preparing an opinion, an opt-in approach 
would effectively nullify the Covered Opinion Regulations if § 6662(b)(6) 
becomes the IRS’s penalty of choice for abusive tax shelters.   
Alternatively, to the extent that the other accuracy-related penalties 
remain viable possibilities in the context of tax shelters, an opt-in approach 
would weaken the link between tax shelter opinions and the reasonable-
cause-and-good-faith defense against the imposition of such penalties 
arising from the shelters being opined on.  Such an approach would make it 
easier for a practitioner to persuade a client to accept an opinion that does 
not offer penalty protection—even when the client has a strong interest in 
receiving such protection—because the practitioner would no longer have 
to telegraph, on the face of the opinion, the limits as to what the client is 
getting.  This, in turn, would encourage practitioners to favor their own 
                                                 
216. See WATSON & BILLMAN, supra note 74, at 137-38 (discussing how tax shelter 
investors concentrate on a legal opinion’s conclusion and assume the appropriateness of the 
opinion’s qualifications as to legal issues not considered or facts assumed). 
217. Rostain, supra note 73, at 82. 
218. Indeed, even the New York State Bar Association, otherwise one of the staunchest 
supporters of an opt-in regime, does not support the opt-in approach in the case of marketed 
opinions.  See Paul, supra note 66, at 31. 
219. For a discussion of § 6662(b)(6), the strict liability nature of the penalty it imposes 
on transactions that lack economic substance, and the penalty’s potential to undermine the 
“gatekeeper” effect of the Covered Opinion Regulations, see supra Part V.A.3. 
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interests (in not complying with the more exacting due diligence and 
drafting standards) at the expense of their clients' interests (in establishing a 
defense against penalties that may result from aggressive transactions).  
Worse yet, it would seriously erode the role of tax attorneys as 
"gatekeepers" who block their clients' entry into abusive deals.220  Clients 
would still be incented to obtain penalty protection, but practitioners would 
be far less incented to provide it (because it would become all too easy to 
avoid the burdens and risks associated with preparing and delivering a 
covered opinion).  As a result, an opt-in regime would destroy the 
framework that makes the Covered Opinion Regulations effective at 
curtailing abusive tax shelters. 
Most commentators who favor an opt-in approach stress the 
benefits of eliminating now-ubiquitous Non-Reliance Disclaimers from 
practitioners’ written communications.221  As Professor Deborah Schenk 
has rightly observed, "[t]hat is a peculiarly weak reason to support the opt-
in approach."222  Indeed, it becomes an even weaker reason, once the 
Covered Opinion Regulations are revised to apply only to tax shelter 
advice. 
Professor Schenk offers a different argument in favor of an opt-in 
regime.  She disapproves of a reasonable cause defense to penalties in the 
first place,223 and she particularly disagrees that legal opinions should be 
usable in such a defense.224  In short, Professor Schenk views the defense as 
“a ‘get-out-of-jail’ option” that provides taxpayers with an undeserved 
escape from sanctions for violating the law.  (She argues, for example, that 
reliance on a lawyer’s advice is no better an excuse for failing to comply 
with the tax laws than it is for failing to comply with antitrust or securities 
law.225)  Despite these objections, Professor Schenk nevertheless thinks 
that, as long as legal opinions are in fact being used as a defense against 
penalties, the government has a legitimate interest in what those opinions 
say.226  In considering how to formulate (or reformulate) the Covered 
                                                 
220. For a discussion of how the Covered Opinion Regulations use private practice tax 
attorneys as gatekeepers to impede clients from engaging in abusive deals, see supra Part 
V.A.1-2.  
221. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 66, at 17-18; Schizer, supra note 100, at 363; Vasquez 
& Vasquez, supra note 56, at 313-14 (quoting published comments of attorney Kenneth 
Gideon). 
222. Schenk, supra note 67, at 1316 n.22.  
223. Id. at 1312 (“Most people support a broad reasonable cause exception to tax 
penalties.  I am not one of them.  I’d favor a strict liability penalty in many cases.”). 
224. Id. (“I am unimpressed with the argument that a taxpayer should be able to rely 
absolutely on a lawyer’s opinion. . . . ‘My lawyer told me it was OK’ does not strike me as a 
sufficient justification for avoiding penalties for behavior Congress has chosen to penalize . . 
. .”). 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 1312, 1313.  Notwithstanding her opposition to using legal opinions as 
penalty protection, Professor Schenk takes the current interpretation of § 6664(c) of the 
Code—to permit reliance on an attorney’s opinion for purposes of reasonable cause 
defense—“as a given.”  Id. at 1313. 




Opinion Regulations, she therefore says that the relevant question is:  "How 
better to carry out the appropriate Treasury goal of regulating opinions used 
for penalty protection?"227  By framing the issue this way, Professor Schenk 
starts from the premise that the object of the regulations is to prevent 
taxpayers from avoiding penalties (and, specifically, to use legal opinions to 
avoid penalties) in instances when they should remain subject to those 
penalties.  
She concludes that an opt-in system would be preferable to the opt-
out approach as a way to achieve that goal.228  By confining the Covered 
Opinion Regulations to opinions that expressly state an intention to be used 
as penalty protection, Professor Schenk believes that we could “eliminate 
much complexity engendered by the current rules” and that we could 
“retain the extensive rules only for penalty-protection opinions and jettison 
the rest.”229  Under this theory, complexity would be reduced because the 
more complicated question of which Circular 230 § 10.35(c) category an 
opinion falls within would be replaced by the simpler question of whether 
penalty protection is expressly sought.230  The various challenges created by 
the regulations’ due diligence and drafting standards would be also avoided 
in most cases, because those standards would apply only to the narrow 
universe of opinions that expressly state that they can be used as a defense 
against penalties.231 
Professor Schenk's argument has appeal if one accepts her initial 
premise—viz., that the purpose of the regulations ought to be to curtail the 
inappropriate avoidance of penalties.  That premise is mistaken, however.  
The point of the regulations is not to curtail the underpayment of penalties; 
it is to curtail the underpayment of tax.  The imposition of penalties is 
not an end in itself; rather, the threat of penalties is a means to the end of 
discouraging tax evasion.  In one sense, permitting a reasonable cause 
defense against penalties may seem overly generous to noncompliant 
taxpayers.  To that extent, Professor Schenk's observations are well taken.  
However, the availability of such a defense does not function merely as a 
gift to the undeserving.  Instead, as discussed above, the possibility of such 
a defense—and, in particular, the express ability to use a covered opinion as 
part of such a defense, in the context of a corporate tax shelter—is an 
essential element of empowering tax attorneys to act as gatekeepers who 
                                                 
227. Id. at 1316. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. (“Under an opt-in approach, only one decision would need to be made: Is 
penalty protection sought or not?”). 
231. Id. (noting that, under an opt-in approach, only an opinion that “states that it is 
intended to be relied on” would be subject to the Covered Opinion Requirements, and 
describing how, in other cases, practitioners would not have to be concerned with “fine 
gradations” in the regulations, such as whether a given transaction is a Principal Purpose 
Transaction or a Significant Purpose Transaction). 
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impede clients from engaging in abusive shelters.232  Because enlisting the 
aid of the private tax bar in that way is critical to stemming the tide of such 
transactions,233 the regulations should be written to cover as wide a swath of 
tax shelter opinions as possible.234  For this reason, moving to an opt-in 
approach would be exactly the wrong direction to go. 
 
D. After the Regulations are arrowed to Apply Only to Tax Shelter 
Advice, the Opt-Out System Should Also Be Done Away With 
The reasons for rejecting an opt-in approach also militate in favor 
of doing away with the opt-out system.  A regulatory scheme is of little 
utility to the extent that it allows those whose activity is meant to be 
regulated to choose not to be regulated.  The primary need for allowing 
practitioners to “opt out” under the current system is to enable them to 
navigate around some of the burdens that the Covered Opinion Regulations 
can otherwise impose on the provision of legitimate tax planning advice, 
given that a “significant purpose” of almost any such advice is to avoid the 
payment of tax.  If the suggestions in Part V.B are adopted and “significant 
purpose” is defined to refer exclusively to tax shelters, that need falls away.  
Once the Covered Opinion Regulations apply only to tax shelter advice (as 
they should), they will cease to affect the legitimate tax-efficient-structuring 
work on which the vast majority of tax practitioners focus the vast majority 
of their efforts, and the lion’s share of the burdens associated with the 
regulations will thus disappear on their own (without the need to invoke any 
“opt-out”).  In this beautiful world, the only remaining role for an opt-out 
provision would be to allow practitioners to escape the purview of the 
regulations specifically when providing tax shelter advice.  In virtually all 
cases, that is a bad idea. 
First, if the new § 6662(b)(6) strict liability penalty were to replace 
the other accuracy-related penalties in the context of tax shelters,235 and if 
the Covered Opinion Regulations were appropriately restricted to tax 
shelter opinions, the opt-out rules would completely vitiate the regulations.  
In a strict liability penalty environment, retaining the opt-out regime would 
effectively reduce the regulations to a nullity, for much the same reason that 
                                                 
232. For a discussion of the Treasury regulation expressly providing that good-faith 
reliance on the opinion of a professional tax advisor may establish the minimum 
requirements for the reasonable cause exception to the substantial underpayment penalty 
attributable to tax shelter items of corporations, see supra notes 89, 178 and accompanying 
text. 
233. See Schizer, supra note 100, at 331-45, 355-71.  
234. This obviously does not mean that the regulations should not also be narrowed so 
that they cover only advice concerning tax shelters, and not advice related to legitimate tax 
planning.  See supra Part V.B. 
235. For a discussion of the new strict liability penalty under § 6662(b)(6) of 
transactions that lack economic substance under § 7701(o), and how the penalty may affect 
the Covered Opinion Regulations, see supra Part V.A.3. 




enacting an opt-in rule would.236   Simply put, the regulations would 
become wholly ineffective because practitioners would almost always 
choose to opt out of compliance with them. 
Under the opt-out rules, the only requisite for opting out of 
compliance with the Covered Opinion Regulations when delivering a 
reliance opinion for a Significant Purpose Transaction is to include a Non-
Reliance Disclaimer prominently in the opinion.237  Thus, the only 
consequence of opting out is that the recipient is restricted from invoking 
the opinion as part of a reasonable cause defense against accuracy-related 
penalties that the IRS may asset against the transaction.  Obviously, that 
restriction becomes irrelevant if the accuracy-related penalty that would 
most likely apply is a strict liability penalty for which there is no reasonable 
cause defense.  In such a case, the recipient would lose nothing by living 
with the disclaimer and, thus, there would be no practical reason for the 
practitioner to choose to comply with the regulations when he or she could 
instead opt out and avoid the costs and burdens of compliance.  (It is 
presumably for this reason, for example, that the current regulations do not 
permit practitioners to opt out when delivering opinions regarding 
transactions to which the strict liability penalty under § 6662A(c) may 
potentially apply.238) 
                                                 
236. For a discussion of the incompatibility of an opt-in rule with the Covered Opinion 
Regulations under a strict liability penalty regime, see supra text accompanying note 219.  
237. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2010).  For an outline of the opt-out rules 
pertaining to reliance opinions for Significant Purpose Transactions, see supra text 
accompanying notes 49-51.  For a description of what constitutes a “reliance opinion” under 
Circular 230, see supra note 8.  
238. Section 6662A(c) provides for a penalty in the amount of 30% of a reportable 
transaction understatement in the case of an undisclosed reportable transaction.  See I.R.C. 
§ 6662A(c) (2010).  Under § 6664(d), there is no reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exception 
to the § 6662A(c) penalty.  See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(A) (2010). (The intent to prevent 
application of the reasonable cause exception in the case of undisclosed reportable 
transactions remains clear, despite a drafting oversight in connection with March 30, 2010 
amendments to § 6664(d), as a result of which § 6662A(c) erroneously cross-references 
§ 6664(d)(2)(A) rather than § 6664(d)(3)(A).  For an explanation as to this drafting error and 
the intended interplay between §§ 6662A(c) and 6664(d)(3)(A), see supra note 94.)  The 
§ 6662A(c) accuracy-related penalty for undisclosed reportable transactions is thus a strict 
liability penalty.  Reportable transactions include Listed Transactions, transactions subject to 
conditions of confidentiality, transactions subject to contractual protections, loss transactions 
(i.e., transactions that generate losses in excess of certain specified thresholds) and 
transactions of interest (which are the same as, or substantially similar to, Listed 
Transactions).  See IRS Instructions for Form 8886 (Rev. Mar. 2010) (Reportable 
Transaction Disclosure Statement) at 1-3.  Correspondingly, there is no permission to opt out 
of compliance with the Covered Opinion Regulations when drafting an opinion related to a 
Listed Transaction, a Significant Purpose Transaction that is subject to conditions of 
confidentiality, a Significant Purpose Transaction that is subject to contractual protections, 
or a Principal Purpose Transaction.  (It is reasonable to assume that any transaction that is 
“reportable” by virtue of being a significant loss transaction would most likely be a Principal 
Purpose Transaction under Circular 230 § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(B).)  See generally 31 C.F.R. 
§ 10.35(b)(2)(i) (2010); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing categories 
of opinions to which the opt-out rules do not apply).  Thus, the Covered Opinion 
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Similarly, to opt out of compliance when issuing a marketed 
opinion for a Significant Purpose Transaction, the only additional 
requirements are to include additional disclaimers stating that the opinion is 
being used to market the transaction and that investors should consult their 
own tax advisors.239  If a marketed opinion regarding a tax shelter would 
not be available as a defense against imposition of the § 6662(b)(6) penalty 
in any event, the need to include those added disclaimers would most likely 
be insufficient to dissuade the drafter from opting out of compliance with 
the regulations. 
Ultimately, if the § 6662(b)(6) penalty turns out to be the penalty 
applied in all or most future tax shelter cases,240 there will be virtually no 
disincentive for a practitioner to opt out of compliance with the Covered 
Opinion Regulations when preparing a tax shelter opinion that would 
otherwise constitute a reliance opinion or a marketed opinion concerning a 
Significant Purpose Transaction.  If the opt-out rules remain in place, then 
most (if not all) such opinions will contain irrelevant Non-Reliance 
Disclaimers, and the regulations will therefore be technically inapplicable 
to those opinions (because they will not constitute “covered opinions” 
under Circular 230).  In this way, the Covered Opinion Regulations will 
become almost completely enervated.  To prevent this, if § 6662(b)(6) 
becomes the predominant accuracy-related penalty applied to abusive tax 
shelters, the opt-out rules must be repealed.241   
Moreover, even assuming that other accuracy-related penalties (to 
which legal opinions can provide a defense) will retain some vitality in the 
context of future tax shelters, it would still be a bad idea to retain the 
current opt-out regime if the Covered Opinion Regulations are narrowed to 
cover only tax shelter opinions. 
                                                                                                                 
Regulations already restrict the opt-out rules from applying with respect to the delivery of an 
opinion concerning any type of transaction as to which a strict liability penalty under 
§ 6662A(c) could apply.  Section 6662A(c) was the only accuracy-related penalty as to 
which there was no reasonable-cause-and-good-faith exception under § 6664 at the time 
when the Covered Opinion Regulations were authorized and promulgated.  (The JOBS Act 
both authorized the Covered Opinion Regulations and enacted §§ 6662A(c) and 6664(d) in 
2004.)  For further discussion of the § 6662A(c) penalty and the strict liability status of that 
of that penalty under § 6664(d), see supra note 94 and accompanying text.  For a discussion 
of what constitutes a “reportable transaction” under the Code, see supra note 93 and 
accompanying text.  
239. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(5)(ii)(B), (C) (2010).  For a discussion of the complete 
requirements for “opting out” in the context of a marketed opinion, including the Non-
Reliance Disclaimer and the consumer-protections legends that are needed, see supra notes 
49-53 and accompanying text.  For a description of what constitutes a “marketed opinion” 
under Circular 230, see supra note 9. 
240. For a discussion of this possibility, see supra Part V.A.3. 
241. Cf. Jeremiah Coder, Alexander Addresses Determination of Economic Substance 
Relevance, 127 TAX NOTES 1076, 1077 (June 7, 2010) (recounting observation of attorney 
Bryan C. Skarlatos that “legal opinions are no longer protection, with the introduction of a 
strict liability penalty applied to transactions that lack economic substance” and statement by 
Karen Gilbreath Sowell of Ernst & Young LLP that “[a]s a result of the [economic 
substance] statute, best practices in opinion writing will have to evolve”). 




It would be an especially bad idea in the context of marketed 
opinions.  Although the rules currently allow for Non-Reliance Disclaimers 
to appear in marketed opinions,242 it is difficult to understand the rationale 
for that.  None of the justifications that one might invoke in connection with 
some other forms of advice would appear to apply in the case of marketed 
opinions.  For example, there cannot be any concern about undue 
restrictions on the provision of informal or piecemeal advice to a client,243 
because marketed opinions, by their very nature, are formal opinions 
intended to influence the investment decisions of non-clients.  Nor should 
there be any worry about a restriction on the ability of practitioners to 
distinguish between important and unimportant tax issues.244  In fact, just 
the opposite is true.  In the context of marketed opinions, there is a 
particular need to regulate against the use of misleading “partial” opinions 
that simply ignore problematic tax questions in order to convey a false 
sense that the shelter being marketed is legitimate.  A requirement to cover 
all significant federal tax issues is thus especially apt in that case.  Finally, 
there is absolutely no justification for concern about cost burdens in the 
case of marketed opinions.  They are, after all, essentially nothing other 
than advertisements for (often dubious) financial products. 
These same analyses apply equally well to opinions regarding 
transactions that are subject to conditions of confidentiality or are subject to 
contractual protection.245  In addition, as noted above, such transactions (if 
not properly disclosed and later found to be abusive) are subject to a strict 
liability penalty under § 6662A(c).246  For all of these reasons, there should 
be no option to opt out of compliance with the Covered Opinion 
Regulations when providing those categories of opinions, either.  (And, 
indeed, no such option currently exists.) 
The remaining question is whether there is any place for an opt-out 
provision in the case of other sorts of Listed Transaction opinions, Principal 
Purpose Transaction opinions, or Significant Purpose Transaction opinions.  
(Just to be clear, the last category refers strictly to transactions that meet the 
narrow tax-shelter-specific “significant purpose” definition advocated in 
Part V.B above.)  Are there ever good reasons for allowing practitioners to 
opt out of the Covered Opinion Regulations when providing any types of 
tax shelter advice? 
One particularly bad reason for doing so would be to alleviate cost 
burdens.  Keep in mind that we are now talking about a transaction cost to 
be borne by those who are investigating the boundaries of the most 
aggressive strategies they can pursue to avoid or evade taxes.  Such clients 
deserve thoughtful, professional advice, but they do not deserve much 
                                                 
242. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(5)(ii)(A) (2010). 
243. See supra Part IV.C. 
244. See supra Part IV.D. 
245. For a discussion of what it means under Circular 230 for an opinion to be subject 
to conditions of confidentiality or to contractual protection, see supra notes 10-11. 
246. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
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sympathy when it comes to matters of expense.  Attorney Casey R. Law has 
summarized this issue particularly well:   
[A]ssisting a client in taking an aggressive (i.e. legally 
dubious) tax-saving position is a legally and ethically 
serious matter; in advising such a client, it is (even apart 
from Circular 230) a very good idea for an attorney to 
engage in the diligent preparation and careful analysis 
required for “covered opinions”; and . . . any client who 
could potentially benefit from such advice has both the 
financial ability and the moral obligation to pay for it in 
proportion to the attorney’s labor and risk.247   
Compromising the cohesion and effectiveness of the Covered Opinion 
Regulations by allowing practitioners to opt out of complying with them 
when dispensing tax shelter advice should not be countenanced on the 
ground that covered opinions are expensive. 
A more legitimate concern is whether the Covered Opinion 
Regulations prevent practitioners from providing informal advice from 
which clients would benefit, or whether they otherwise impede the normal 
flow of communications between attorneys and clients, in the context of tax 
shelters.248  The short answer is that they do not.  Informal communications 
(such as increasingly prevalent e-mails) and piecemeal items of advice 
throughout the gestation of a deal are plainly essential to the provision of 
sound transactional counsel (tax-related or otherwise).  However, such 
advice is almost always already excepted from the “covered opinion” 
definition under the exclusion for preliminary advice pursuant to Circular 
230 § 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(A).  That section (the “Preliminary Advice 
Exclusion”) provides that “[a] covered opinion does not include . . . 
[w]ritten advice provided to a client during the course of an engagement if a 
practitioner is reasonably expected to provide subsequent written advice to 
the client that satisfies the requirements of” Circular 230 § 10.35.249 
The New York State Bar Association has argued that at least some 
instances of informal or piecemeal advice may not come within the 
Preliminary Advice Exclusion because, at the time the advice is provided, 
“there may be no expectation . . . that formal advice on the topic would be 
expected.”250  That assertion seems peculiar, particularly in the context of 
advice concerning corporate tax shelters.  There are extremely few, if any, 
corporate transactional engagements in which the practitioner’s advice 
consists solely of informal communications and piecemeal snippets.  A 
formal, comprehensive opinion of counsel is almost always a prerequisite to 
the completion of a complex or significant corporate transaction.  Thus, the 
                                                 
247. Law, supra note 69, at 33-34. 
248. For a discussion of concerns that the Covered Opinion Regulations prevent 
informal advice and impede communications between practitioners and clients, see supra 
Part IV.C. 
249. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(A) (2010). 
250. Paul, supra note 66, at 27. 




New York State Bar Association’s contention does not comport with the 
realities of corporate law practice and is particularly out of place in a 
discussion of advice concerning corporate tax shelters.  (The same is most 
likely also true in the case of personal deals done by high-net-worth 
individuals.)  Accordingly, the only time when ultimate formal advice on a 
tax shelter should not reasonably be expected is if a proposed transaction is 
never consummated.  In such a case, the entire question is moot, because 
there are no tax underpayments (and therefore no substantial underpayment 
penalties from which to be protected) stemming from deals that are never 
done.  In the spirit of clarity and completeness, however, Treasury should 
consider amending Circular 230 § 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(A) to state that advice on 
proposed transactions that are never completed also comes within the scope 
of the Preliminary Advice Exception.  In any event, protecting the normal 
flow of informal communication and piecemeal advice does not require or 
justify allowing practitioners to opt out of compliance with the Covered 
Opinion Regulations when providing counsel concerning tax shelters. 
Next, there is once again the question of having to cover all 
significant federal tax issues.251   Although the problem of “partial 
opinions” is particularly acute in the case of marketed opinions and 
opinions that are either subject to contractual protection or subject to 
conditions of confidentiality, the potential for misusing partial opinions to 
imbue an aura of legitimacy on an abusive transaction is not confined to 
those areas.  The most effective means by which to combat this problem is 
to enforce the requirement to cover all significant federal tax issues in the 
context of all tax shelter advice (other than advice that comes within the 
Preliminary Advice Exception discussed above).   
This is not to suggest that the concerns inherent in limiting a 
practitioner’s ability to distinguish between important and unimportant 
issues are not real or significant.  As discussed above,252 this rule places 
substantial burdens on both practitioners and clients, and, for this reason, it 
is imperative that the rule not be applied in anything other than the tax 
shelter context.   In the specific case of tax shelters, however, the trade-offs 
between the regulation’s burdens and its deterrent effects are unfortunately 
justified by historical experience.  As Professor Scott Schumacher has 
stated, “[t]he tax shelter boom and related problems could not have 
occurred without lawyers and accountants.  Thus, if tax professionals and 
taxpayers are stymied by the government’s actions in this area, we have 
ourselves primarily to blame.”253  Tax practitioners should not be able to 
opt out of the Covered Opinion Regulations to avoid covering all 
significant federal tax issues when advising on tax shelters. 
                                                 
251. This requirement for covered opinions is set forth in 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(i) 
(2010).  For a description of what constitutes a “significant Federal tax issue” under Circular 
230, see supra note 8. 
252. See supra Part IV.D. 
253. Schumacher, supra note 72, at 100-01 (citations omitted). 
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For all of these reasons, after the Covered Opinion Regulations are 
revised to apply only to tax shelter advice, the ability to opt out of 
compliance with the regulations should be removed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Though some members of the tax bar may suspect otherwise, the 
Covered Opinion Regulations did not emerge as part of a nefarious plot to 
wreak havoc on the practice of tax law.  Rather, the regulations are an 
unfortunately necessary response to the egregious behavior of tax 
practitioners whose unsound legal opinions facilitated the rise of abusive 
corporate tax shelters in the 1990s.  The regulations have been effective at 
curbing abusive shelter activity because they have both proscribed those 
unscrupulous opinion practices and created incentives that cause 
practitioners to dissuade their clients from investing in unduly aggressive 
transactions.   It is too bad that the new strict liability penalty for non-
economic-substance transactions may reduce the future effectiveness of 
those incentives that directly encourage good taxpayer behavior.  Even if 
that occurs, however, the Covered Opinion Regulations will remain needed 
to discourage the bad practitioner behavior that gave rise to their 
promulgation in the first place. 
Despite their effectiveness and the importance of their role, the 
Covered Opinion Regulations are not without substantial flaws.  In an effort 
to ensure the Covered Opinion Regulations apply to advice concerning all 
potentially abusive transactions, the regulations were written so broadly that 
they unnecessarily impose on virtually all tax advice—even routine advice 
concerning plainly legitimate tax planning.  This has created a number of 
burdens on the provision of sound tax counsel outside the shelter context, 
which has disadvantaged practitioner and client alike.  To remedy those 
problems, the scope of the Covered Opinion Regulations must be realigned 
so that the regulations cover all tax shelter advice, but no other tax advice.   
This Article recommends a specific revision to the definition of a “covered 
opinion” under the regulations, to accomplish this.  If that revision is made, 
and if the opt-out rules (and the misguided “opt-in” alternative to those 
rules) are discarded as well, then the regulations will continue to function as 
an important tool to combat abusive shelter activity without adversely 
affecting the rest of tax practice. 
 
